Salience and Preference Reversals (Online Study)
How to cite
Ritschel, Alexander; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos. 2020. "Salience and Preference Reversals (Online Study)." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005988. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5988-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The preference reversal phenomenon refers to a pattern of decisions under risk where decision makers explicitly value long-shot lotteries above more moderate ones but then choose the latter, in contradiction with Expected Utility Theory. The phenomenon is typically demonstrated in paradigms involving pairs of lotteries consisting of a relatively safe lottery, called the P-bet (for "probability"), and a riskier lottery offering a larger prize (a long shot), called the $-bet. Decision makers often choose the P-bet in the direct choice task, but explicitly value the $-bet above the P-bet, in contradiction with the most basic tenets of decision theories under risk, and specifically with the indifference between a lottery and its certainty equivalent. This phenomenon reveals an inconsistency between elicitation methods which should be equivalent.
Salience theory postulates that reversals occur because certain states are overweighted due to their salience. To test this hypothesis we conduct an online experiment analyzing decisions under risk while implementing two treatments which manipulate salience. See the hypothesis in the attached pdf.
Experimental design
Classical preference reversal experiment conducted online where subjects choose and evaluate lottery pairs. There will be two between-subject treatments for evaluating lotteries.
Design details
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