Optimal incentives to give
How to cite
Petrie, Ragan; Castillo, Marco. 2020. "Optimal incentives to give." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005918. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5918-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We implement a field experiment to examine optimal incentives for charitable giving. The price of giving is varied by offering a fixed match if the donation meets a threshold amount (e.g. "give at least $25 and the charity receives a $25 match''). Different threshold matches are tested in the field with participating charities.
Intervention
We implement a field experiment to examine optimal incentives for charitable giving. Potential donors are offered, via an email, a match incentive if they make a donation. The price of giving is varied by offering a fixed match if the donation meets a threshold amount (e.g. "give at least $25 and the charity receives a $25 match''). Different threshold matches are tested in the field with participating charities.
Experimental design
We implement a field experiment to examine optimal incentives for charitable giving. Potential donors are offered, via an email, a match incentive if they make a donation. The price of giving is varied by offering a fixed match if the donation meets a threshold amount (e.g. "give at least $25 and the charity receives a $25 match''). Different threshold matches are tested in the field with participating charities.
Design details
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