Default information sharing, financial incentive and loan repayment: A field experiment

How to cite

He, Haoran; Weng, Qian. 2020. "Default information sharing, financial incentive and loan repayment: A field experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005913. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5913-1.0

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Haoran He* , Qian Weng

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005913
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5913-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2020-04-20 – 2021-04-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5913

Abstract

We investigate the effects of reporting loan delinquency information to a nationwide official credit score system combined with the financial incentive of deducting part of the overdue loan on loan delinquents’ repayment behavior. We do this using experimental manipulation in collaboration with a large Chinese P2P lending platform. We test for difference in repayment responses across treatments.

Experimental design

We use a 1 × 3 factorial design in which we vary the financial incentive and reporting loan delinquency information. We implement the experimental manipulation in two stages, one stage of intervention lasting for one month. In the first stage, in the Control treatment, the delinquents are reminded to repay the overdue loan by above-described standard procedure. In the Deduct treatment, in addition to the standard procedure as in the Control treatment, the subjects are further informed that a proportion of the overdue amount would be deducted if they repaid the deducted overdue amount in full within one month. In the Deduct&Report treatment, in addition to informing the subjects of the deduction as in the Deduct treatment, they are further informed that, if they could not repay the deducted overdue amount in full within one month, their delinquency, including individual identification information and the overdue loan amount, would be reported to the credit score system. All the treatments are implemented by operators based on standard procedures that are carefully designed and recorded and the frequency of contact is on a daily basis.

In the second stage, for subjects who have not repaid the deducted overdue amount in full in the Deduct&Report treatment, the platform actually reports their delinquency to the social credit rating system and informs these delinquents right after the report. Subjects are also informed that the platform would update their record as “having fully repaid the loan” in the social credit rating system once the platform received their deducted repayment in full. In the Control and the Deduct&Report treatments, the implemented treatment conditions are identical to those in the first stage.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer. We stratefy the sample by online and offline programs, and then randomly assign all the sampled delinquents with matched overdue loan amount into various treatments.
Randomization unit
The unit (clusters) of randomization in our experiment is at the individual loan delinquent level.
Clusters
4500 individual loan delinquents
Observations
4500 individual loan delinquents
Arms
There are 1500 loan delinquents in each of the three treatments.
Primary outcomes
1. Whether to repay the overdue loan 2. How much in amount and in percentage is the overdue loan repaid 3. When the overdue loan is repaid 4. Net benefit of the intervention

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords