Sorting and wage premiums in immoral work

How to cite

Schneider, Florian; Brun, Fanny; Weber, Roberto. 2020. "Sorting and wage premiums in immoral work." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005865. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5865-1.0

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Florian Schneider* , Fanny Brun , Roberto Weber

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005865
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5865-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-02-01 – 2017-05-31
Countries
Switzerland ()
JEL codes
C92, J31, D03
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5865

Abstract

We use surveys, laboratory experiments and administrative labor-market data to study how heterogeneity in the perceived immorality of work and in workers’ aversion to acting immorally interact to impact labor market outcomes. Specifically, we investigate whether those individuals least concerned with acting morally select into jobs generally perceived as immoral and whether the aversion among many individuals to performing such acts contributes to immorality wage premiums, a form of compensating differential. We show that immoral work is associated with higher wages, both using correlational evidence from administrative labor-market data and causal evidence from a laboratory experiment. We also measure individuals’ aversion to performing immoral acts and show that those who find immoral behavior least aversive are more likely to be employed in immoral work in the lab and have a relative preference for work perceived as immoral outside the laboratory. We note that sorting by “immoral” types into jobs that can cause harm may be detrimental for society. Our study also highlights the value of employing complementary research methods.

Experimental design

In the experiment, we first elicit measures of subjects’ concern for morality. We obtain two measures of individuals’ aversion to acting immorally, from a behavioral task and from a survey conducted several days apart. We use these measures to investigate whether participants with low concerns for morality sort into immoral labor markets (employment rates). Second, subjects participate in a laboratory labor market for 15 periods, in which they submit reservation wages for performing a task. The key feature of our laboratory experiment is that we vary by treatment only the degree to which work is immoral, while holding constant all other job characteristics, including the specific actions subjects take when employed. We use this exogenous variation in job immorality to study whether immoral work is associated with higher wages (average market wages).

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
experimental session
Clusters
We conducted 10 sessions. Each session consists of 4 markets / 24 participants.
Observations
240 participants
Arms
168 participants in the immoral market treatment 72 participants in the neutral market treatment
Primary outcomes
Average market wages, employment rates

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords