Analysis of player decisions in a mobile game to study the influence of wealth on risk aversion
How to cite
Huber, Tobias; Jaspersen, Johannes Gerd; Richter, Andreas; Strümpel, Dennis.
2020. "Analysis of player decisions in a mobile game to study the influence of wealth on risk aversion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005847.
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5847-1.0
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Tobias Huber*
, Johannes Gerd Jaspersen
, Andreas Richter
, Dennis Strümpel
We analyze the choices available to players of a mobile game, which is a closed economic system. The players’ decisions under risk allow us to estimate changes of risk aversion when wealth changes. In contrast to previous literature, we are able to exclude inertia and the asset integration problem. The field experiment allows for tests against the null hypothesis of constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion.
Intervention
This is a measurement study and the choice problems will occur randomly. We randomly split the subjects into Group G1 and Group G2. The group designation determines which choice problems the subjects face (see below).
Experimental design
This study is a measurement study and the choice problems will occur randomly. We randomly split the sample into two groups. The group designation determines which choice problems the subjects face (see above).
Design details
Randomization method
Subjects are randomly allocated to the two groups when agreeing to the consent form.The specific lottery displayed after every successful completion of the game is chosen randomly by the computer.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit of the group allocation is the individual player. Specific choices from the group menu are randomly allocated after every successful game completion.
Clusters
Not applicable to our case (see above).
Observations
Our setting deviates from traditional experiments in the sense that the number of downloads in Google’s Play Store determines the number of subjects in our experiment. We will upload the game to Google’s Play Store on 8 May 2020 and expect the game to
be public at latest after 7 days (depending on Google’s Play Store). We will additionally upload a promotional video to YouTube on 16 May 2020 (this date is, however, subject to discretion of the promoting influences). We expect only a small number of game downloads until the release of the promotional video and thus see the date of the promotional video as our trial start. 60 days after the release of the promotional video we stop collecting data. The sample size of our experiment is therefore dependent on the number of downloads from Google’s Play Store and the game’s retention rate. Thus, the sample size is not predictable at this stage. We will additionally filter our data as described below and provide for each filter the corresponding reason in parentheses: (1) We remove players that are uniquely identifiable based on the collected demographic variables (self-reported age, self-reported gender, and country). [data protection law] (2)
We are only allowed to process the choice of players that specify an age greater or equal to 16. [data protection law] (3) Both lotteries L_A and L_R will show up not before a total in-game wealth level of at least 100. [experimental design] (4) Both lotteries L_A and L_R
will only show up if a player reaches at least 10 points in the corresponding run. [experimental design]. (5) The first three decisions of our subjects may be systematically different than the subsequent decisions because subjects examine in the first rounds how the game and how the lotteries work. Therefore, we plan to conduct two analyses: (a) We include all decisions of our subjects. (b) We exclude the first three decisions of our subjects. [learning behavior]
Arms
We have two treatment arms. In each treatment arm, we have half of the total number of subjects.
Primary outcomes
At different levels of in-game wealth w, the subjects choose between taking part in a lottery or receiving a safe payment (see below). We examine how the probability to choose the safe payment depends on the in-game wealth level w. Thus, we can deduct how the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion depend on the in-game wealth level w.
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