Fairness and Risk in Ultimatum Bargaining
How to cite
Hyndman, Kyle; Walker, Matthew. 2020. "Fairness and Risk in Ultimatum Bargaining." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005846. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5846-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Using online experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), we will investigate what constitutes a fair allocation of risk in ultimatum bargaining. There are two agents, a proposer and a responder. We are interested in how offer and acceptance decisions differ when the proposer offers a probabilistic allocation of an indivisible asset, versus the standard case in which the asset is divisible and the proposer proposes a deterministic surplus allocation. We are also interested in how the timing of the resolution of uncertainty affects behavior.
Intervention
The purpose of our intervention is to understand how risk and intentions affect the fairness perceptions of agents in simple ultimatum bargaining environments. To study this, we will compare behavior of both proposers and responders in standard ultimatum games and in risky ultimatum games, where in the latter, we will vary the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.
Experimental design
Subjects will participate in two ultimatum games as either a proposer or a responder: a standard ultimatum game (Standard UG) and a "lottery" ultimatum game (Lottery UG) in which there is an indivisible prize and the object of negotiation is the probability of winning the prize. We will conduct treatments with direct response by responders (Risk-Direct) and using the strategy method (Risk-Strategy). In order to also study the role of intentions, we consider a treatment variation in which the responder makes his/her accept/reject decision in the Lottery UG after the resolution of uncertainty (Intent-Direct).
Design details
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