Fairness and Risk in Ultimatum Bargaining

How to cite

Hyndman, Kyle; Walker, Matthew. 2020. "Fairness and Risk in Ultimatum Bargaining." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005846. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5846-1.1

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Kyle Hyndman* , Matthew Walker

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005846
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5846-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-05-15 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5846

Abstract

Using online experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), we will investigate what constitutes a fair allocation of risk in ultimatum bargaining. There are two agents, a proposer and a responder. We are interested in how offer and acceptance decisions differ when the proposer offers a probabilistic allocation of an indivisible asset, versus the standard case in which the asset is divisible and the proposer proposes a deterministic surplus allocation. We are also interested in how the timing of the resolution of uncertainty affects behavior.

Intervention

The purpose of our intervention is to understand how risk and intentions affect the fairness perceptions of agents in simple ultimatum bargaining environments. To study this, we will compare behavior of both proposers and responders in standard ultimatum games and in risky ultimatum games, where in the latter, we will vary the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.

Experimental design

Subjects will participate in two ultimatum games as either a proposer or a responder: a standard ultimatum game (Standard UG) and a "lottery" ultimatum game (Lottery UG) in which there is an indivisible prize and the object of negotiation is the probability of winning the prize. We will conduct treatments with direct response by responders (Risk-Direct) and using the strategy method (Risk-Strategy). In order to also study the role of intentions, we consider a treatment variation in which the responder makes his/her accept/reject decision in the Lottery UG after the resolution of uncertainty (Intent-Direct).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Groups of participants (sessions) are randomized to experimental treatments. We control for the order in which the two tasks are presented by randomly assigning half of subjects within each treatment to complete the Standard UG first and the other half to complete the Lottery UG first. In the first task, roles are assigned randomly in the pair. To permit within-subjects comparisons, participants retain the same role for the second task and the new pairing.
Clusters
Based on our current plan, we estimate conducting 6-7 sessions per treatment, for a total of 18 - 21 sessions.
Observations
50 complete pairs per treatment, with 3 treatments for a total of 300 subjects.
Arms
50 in Risk-Direct 50 in Risk-Strategy 50 in Intent-Direct
Primary outcomes
Offers by proposers and accept/reject decisions by responders

Cited by

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Keywords