Impact of Preferential Rank Incentives on University Test Scores
How to cite
Roy, Sutanuka. 2020. "Impact of Preferential Rank Incentives on University Test Scores." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005841. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5841-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This is a large-scale cluster randomized experiment involving over 14,000 undergraduate students at universities in the State of Assam and Meghalaya, designed to test the individual impacts of providing rank based financial incentives to low income or socially disadvantaged students in future high stakes anonymized university exams.
Intervention
The financial incentives in our experiment were given out on the basis of test scores in anonymised centralized university semester exams, which are set and marked anonymously. The experiment involved randomization at the cohort level. A cohort is a group of students taking a major course, in degree year "t", in faculty "f" in college "c" affiliated to university "u". Our cluster is a cohort. The untargeted incentive group (i.e., prize incentives for all) included two financial rewards for students in a cohort. In Assam (Meghalya), the first monetary prize, of 4,000 (5,500) rupees, was awarded to the student with the highest grade in the cohort, and the second monetary award, of 3,500 (5,000) rupees, went to the student in the top 40 % with the highest grade improvement in the cohort. The second treatment arm was socially targeted incentives (i.e., prize incentives only for the lower castes), where the same two financial incentives were given only to lower-caste students within a cohort: the first to the highest scorer from a lower caste in the cohort, and the second to the student who was in the top 40 % among lower-caste students in the cohort and who showed the highest improvement in scores compared with their previous university test scores. The third treatment was income targeting (i.e., prize incentives only for the poor), where the same two financial incentives were given to students with an annual family income of 150,000 rupees or less.
Experimental design
It is a cohort level cluster design where students in a cohort are given rank based financial incentives for future anonymised university exams. The details are mentioned in the intervention section.
Design details
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