Discrimination and the role of moral wiggle room.

How to cite

Garcia, Tatiana Orozco; Ibanez, Marcela. 2020. "Discrimination and the role of moral wiggle room.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005764. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5764-1.2

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Tatiana Orozco Garcia* , Marcela Ibanez

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005764
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5764-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-11-17 – 2021-01-31
Countries
Colombia ()
JEL codes
D90, D80
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5764

Abstract

Conflicts tend to polarize societies generating divisions among citizens along with identity feelings as "enemy vs. friend" or "offender vs. victim." These out-group/in-group stereotypes tend to persist when the civil conflict ends, threatening sustainable peacebuilding possibilities. We investigate whether individuals avoid information and use "moral wiggle room" to excuse selfish behavior.

The context of the study is Colombia. After the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and Farc combatants, reconstruction efforts have focused on combatants' economic reintegration. Unless the population is willing to support the productive projects initiated by ex-combatants, there is a risk of recidivism.

We employ an online field experiment to investigate two main questions. First, we study discriminatory preferences eliciting the WTP for a product produced by either ex-FARC combatants or other farmers. Second, we allow individuals to decide whether or not to receive information, at zero cost, on the identity of the producer of the good, before revealing their WTP. We test if participants strategically decide to remain ignorant of the identity of the producer to act selfishly.

Intervention

We recruit participants using Netquest database that includes a population of 120 thousand subscribers in Colombia. We select a sample of 2000 individuals to participate in a two-stage online experiment and a post-experiment survey.

First state - No feedback:
In the first stage, participants reveal their willingness to pay (WTP) for a product (coffee) produced either by Ex-FARC combatants' cooperative or a farmers' cooperative. Participants reveal their WTP in 6 different scenarios that involve various probabilities of receiving the good produced by Ex-FARC combatants. Under these scenarios, participants do not receive feedback on which product was selected before revealing the WTP, which allows us to investigate if participants hold discriminatory preferences related to the producer's identity. To incentivize true revelation on preferences, we use the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism.

Second stage - Feedback:
In the second stage, we implement a variation of the experiment of Dana et al., 2007 and investigate if participants avoid information about the producer's identity and use moral wiggle room to engage in selfish behavior. Before revealing the WTP, participants can solve the uncertainty about who produced the product and decide whether to receive or not information on the producer's identity at a zero cost. Participants have the possibility to remain ignorant about the origin of the product they are purchasing and use the moral wiggle room to act selfishly disregarding their discriminatory preferences.

All decisions are incentive-compatible as one is selected for payment. Participants receive the product a few days after the experiment.

In the post-experiment survey, we measure attitudes towards ex-combatants, exposure to conflict, risk, and ambiguity aversion and collect data on socioeconomic characteristics.

Experimental design

First, participants are randomized into two groups that vary the identity of the producers (ex-Farc vs farmer) or (Farmer vs. Farmer). All participants need to answer the first six scenarios in which the probabilities of receiving coffee from one of the cooperatives vary. The Farmer-Farmer group compares valuations of the product produced by two different farmers cooperatives.

For stage two, we randomly assigned participants to treatments that vary on two factors:
1. Type of feedback: Exogenous(Exo) vs Endogenous(Endo) Feedback.
2. The probability to confront a product produced by Ex-FARC members: Low or High

Design details

Randomization method
Stratified randomization by main cities followed by simple randomization into treatment.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
2000 individuals
Observations
2000 individuals
Arms
Number of observation by treatment arm in parenthesis Treatment Group: vary in the likelihood to obtain product from ex-FARC vs. Farmers Exo-L (208) Exo-H (208) End-L (417) End-H (417) Pure Control Group: varies the likelihood to obtain a product from two different farmers cooperatives C-Exo-L (125) C-Exo-H (125) C-End-L (250) C-End-H (250)
Primary outcomes
We have three main sets of outcomes of interest: 1. Discriminatory preferences against products of ex-FARC members 2. Information acquisition 3. Consistent preferences
Secondary outcomes
1. Attitudes towards ex-combatants

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Keywords