Relative Pay Comparisons in the Workplace: Field Evidence on Effort and Labor Supply
How to cite
Shamdasani, Yogita; Kaur, Supreet; Breza, Emily. 2015. "Relative Pay Comparisons in the Workplace: Field Evidence on Effort and Labor Supply." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000569. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.569-2.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
A long tradition in economics and psychology has advanced the notion that individuals care about not only their own pay, but also their pay relative to that of their co-workers. We use a field experiment with Indian manufacturing workers to test whether relative pay comparisons affect effort and labor supply. Workers perform individual production tasks, but are organized into distinct teams - defined by the type of product they produce. We randomize teams to receive either compressed wages (where all workers earn the same random daily wage) or heterogeneous wages (where each team member is paid a different wage according to his baseline productivity level). This enables effort comparisons across workers who receive the same absolute wage, but vary in the wages of their co-workers. In addition, we introduce heterogeneity in the extent to which pay differences across co-workers seem justified.
Intervention
We recruit workers from nearby villages to participate full-time in a low-skilled manufacturing job. At our worksites, workers are organized into teams of three and trained in one of ten tasks, for which production is an individual activity. They first undergo a training period, during which they are paid the same daily wage. Once the training period is over, we vary the wages paid across teams, and in some cases, across workers within a team.
Experimental design
Once the training period is over, workers' baseline productivity is assessed, and each worker is assigned a relative productivity rank within their team. We then randomize teams into one of four wage treatments:
(1) Each team member is paid according to his baseline productivity, with the wages for the lowest, middle and highest productivity workers being w_L, w_M and w_H respectively, where w_training < w_L < w_M < w_H
(2) All team members are paid the same daily wage of w_L
(3) All team members are paid the same daily wage of w_M
(4) All team members are paid the same daily wage of w_H
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.