Relative Pay Comparisons in the Workplace: Field Evidence on Eff ort and Labor Supply

How to cite

Shamdasani, Yogita; Kaur, Supreet; Breza, Emily. 2015. "Relative Pay Comparisons in the Workplace: Field Evidence on Eff ort and Labor Supply." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000569. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.569-2.0

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Yogita Shamdasani* , Supreet Kaur , Emily Breza

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000569
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.569-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2014-09-01 – 2015-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
J3, D03, O15, E24
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/569

Abstract

A long tradition in economics and psychology has advanced the notion that individuals care about not only their own pay, but also their pay relative to that of their co-workers. We use a field experiment with Indian manufacturing workers to test whether relative pay comparisons affect effort and labor supply. Workers perform individual production tasks, but are organized into distinct teams - defined by the type of product they produce. We randomize teams to receive either compressed wages (where all workers earn the same random daily wage) or heterogeneous wages (where each team member is paid a different wage according to his baseline productivity level). This enables effort comparisons across workers who receive the same absolute wage, but vary in the wages of their co-workers. In addition, we introduce heterogeneity in the extent to which pay differences across co-workers seem justified.

Intervention

We recruit workers from nearby villages to participate full-time in a low-skilled manufacturing job. At our worksites, workers are organized into teams of three and trained in one of ten tasks, for which production is an individual activity. They first undergo a training period, during which they are paid the same daily wage. Once the training period is over, we vary the wages paid across teams, and in some cases, across workers within a team.

Experimental design

Once the training period is over, workers' baseline productivity is assessed, and each worker is assigned a relative productivity rank within their team. We then randomize teams into one of four wage treatments:

(1) Each team member is paid according to his baseline productivity, with the wages for the lowest, middle and highest productivity workers being w_L, w_M and w_H respectively, where w_training < w_L < w_M < w_H

(2) All team members are paid the same daily wage of w_L

(3) All team members are paid the same daily wage of w_M

(4) All team members are paid the same daily wage of w_H

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization of workers into teams and of teams into treatment is done on a computer.
Randomization unit
Workers are randomized into jobs at the individual level. Once at the worksite, they are randomized into teams. Randomization of teams into wage treatments is done at the team level.
Clusters
N/A
Observations
1200 subjects
Arms
100 teams heterogeneous wage treatment, 300 teams homogenous wage treatment
Primary outcomes
(1) Daily production for each worker, measured by a count of the total items produced in a day (2) Daily attendance of each worker, including time of arrival and departure from worksite (3) Total labor earnings of each worker (4) Team-level output

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords