Measuring the effect of credit subsidy schemes and performance rewards (incentives) on technology take-Up and subsequent investment decisions

How to cite

Diiro, Gracious; Kassie, Menale. 2020. "Measuring the effect of credit subsidy schemes and performance rewards (incentives) on technology take-Up and subsequent investment decisions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005643. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5643-1.1

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Gracious Diiro* , Menale Kassie

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005643
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5643-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2019-08-01 – 2021-08-30
Countries
Uganda (Kamuli district)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5643

Abstract

Adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies, such as the Push-pull technology (PPT) remains limited despite the promotional efforts by icipe and partners necessitating sustainable interventions to address barriers to adoption and impact at scale. Liquidity constraints, uncertainties and lack of reliable and persuasive sources of information about new technologies, their benefits and relevance to local agronomic conditions and details on how to apply the technologies are some of the barriers to their adoption. Smallholder farmers often make technology adoption decisions under uncertainty about the costs or benefits of subsequent investments in the technology after the initial take-up. Subsequent investment in technologies are likely to be low when the technology is perennial in nature such as the PPT. Self-learning may play an important role in reducing uncertainties that influence adoption and investment. We use a field experiment to test whether relaxing liquidity and informational barriers through credit subsidy and performance rewards (to ensure self-learning) can increase adoption (and subsequent investment) of a new technology. The specific objectives include:
1) Test for effect of variations in credit subsidy and incentives (performance rewards) on decision to take up the technology in the presence of uncertainty about the costs and benefits PPT.
2) Test the effect of variations in incentives (performance rewards ) to subsequent investment in PPT after initial take up of the technology

Intervention

Credit subsidy schemes
Performance rewards (materials rewards/reputation rewards)
Push-Pulll technology for controlling striga and insect pests (fall army worm and stemborer) in cereal crops production

Experimental design

The study design involves two stages of randomization of the two main treatments. Both stages of randomization were done during farmer training (organized at at group level) before the beginning of the main cropping season for 2020. The first stage of randomization involved four treatments of credit subsidy (cs) assigned at farmer group level. The cost of the PPT companion planting materials for the technology (i.e. perennial legume (Desmodium) and perennial grass (Napier or Brachiaria) that) formed the subsidy. The credit subsidy treatments include CS1=no subsidy, CS2 =25% subsidy, CS3=50% subsidy, CS4=75% subsidy. All farmers were given a take it or leave it offer of a crops planting material (enough to cover one acre) to be planted and managed by the farmer and his or her household. The second stage of randomization involved assigning performance rewards (R) at individual farmer level to three treatments (R1=material reward such as hand hoe or credit waiver, R2= reputational reward (recognitional certificate), R3=both). The program will offer the performance rewards to the farmer conditional on proper management of the PPT plot during the cropping season.

Design details

Randomization method
We randomized by computer to assign credit subsidies to farmers at group level we then used coin flip to assign the performance rewards at individual level:
Randomization unit
farmer group level and individual farmer level
Clusters
104 farmer groups
Observations
629 maize farmers
Arms
For first stage of randomization: 24 farmer groups -no subsidy, 28 farmer groups-25% subsidy; 22 farmer groups- 50% subsidy and 30 farmer groups 75% subsidy For second stage of randomization: 204 farmers material reward; 205 reputation reward and 220 both material and reputation rewards
Primary outcomes
(i) Technology adoption and investment (ii) yield and household income (iii) milk productivity
Secondary outcomes
food and nutrition security, health and environmental benefits

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords