Citizen Participation and Government Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Environmental Complaints in China

How to cite

Wang, Shaoda; Zhang, Bing; Liu, Mengdi; He, Guojun; Greenstone, Michael; Buntaine, Mark. 2020. "Citizen Participation and Government Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Environmental Complaints in China." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005601. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5601-1.1

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Shaoda Wang* , Bing Zhang , Mengdi Liu , Guojun He , Michael Greenstone , Mark Buntaine

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005601
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5601-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-04-13 – 2021-05-01
Countries
China ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5601

Abstract

We will investigate how the types of complaints by citizens and non-governmental groups about firms that violate pollution standards change violation behavior by firms.

Intervention

We will study the effect of non-governmental complaints on the violation behavior of key firms in China using a multi-arm randomized controlled trial. Firms will be assigned to complaint, information, or control conditions, which will last for a six-month experimental period. Additional, the density of assignment to complaint and information conditions within city-level clusters will be randomly assigned, enabling us to investigate spillover effects of a more or less active non-government sector in making complaints at the city level. Finally, the intensity of complaints or informational notices will be assigned at the firm level, which will allow us to investigate how firms respond to more or less stringent scrutiny of their emissions violations.

Experimental design

We will study the effect of non-governmental complaints on the violation behavior of key firms in China using a multi-arm randomized controlled trial. Firms will be assigned to complaint, information, or control conditions, which will last for a six-month experimental period. Additional, the density of assignment to complaint and information conditions within city-level clusters will be randomly assigned, enabling us to investigate spillover effects of a more or less active non-government sector in making complaints at the city level. Finally, the intensity of complaints or informational notices will be assigned at the firm level, which will allow us to investigate how firms respond to more or less stringent scrutiny of their emissions violations.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
Double randomization: Firm-level and city-level
Clusters
More than 25000 firms
Observations
More than 25000 firms
Arms
More than 25000 firms divided into 7 different arms.
Primary outcomes
Firms' violations of pollution standards, pollution punishments, government responses to appeals, firms' production activities and outputs

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords