Citizen Participation and Government Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Environmental Complaints in China
How to cite
Wang, Shaoda; Zhang, Bing; Liu, Mengdi; He, Guojun; Greenstone, Michael; Buntaine, Mark. 2020. "Citizen Participation and Government Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Environmental Complaints in China." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005601. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5601-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We will investigate how the types of complaints by citizens and non-governmental groups about firms that violate pollution standards change violation behavior by firms.
Intervention
We will study the effect of non-governmental complaints on the violation behavior of key firms in China using a multi-arm randomized controlled trial. Firms will be assigned to complaint, information, or control conditions, which will last for a six-month experimental period. Additional, the density of assignment to complaint and information conditions within city-level clusters will be randomly assigned, enabling us to investigate spillover effects of a more or less active non-government sector in making complaints at the city level. Finally, the intensity of complaints or informational notices will be assigned at the firm level, which will allow us to investigate how firms respond to more or less stringent scrutiny of their emissions violations.
Experimental design
We will study the effect of non-governmental complaints on the violation behavior of key firms in China using a multi-arm randomized controlled trial. Firms will be assigned to complaint, information, or control conditions, which will last for a six-month experimental period. Additional, the density of assignment to complaint and information conditions within city-level clusters will be randomly assigned, enabling us to investigate spillover effects of a more or less active non-government sector in making complaints at the city level. Finally, the intensity of complaints or informational notices will be assigned at the firm level, which will allow us to investigate how firms respond to more or less stringent scrutiny of their emissions violations.
Design details
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