(Dis-)Honesty, incentives and competition: An experimental study

How to cite

Necker, Sarah; Tufano, Fabio; List, John A.. 2020. "(Dis-)Honesty, incentives and competition: An experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005578. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5578-1.1

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Sarah Necker* , Fabio Tufano , John A. List

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005578
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5578-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2020-04-02 – 2020-04-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5578

Abstract

In this experiment, we study how competition and incentives influence individuals’ (dis)honesty. To do so, we implement a mind game in the form of a wheel of fortune game. We hypothesize that the incentive effects will be more sizable whenever there is competition.

Experimental design

We test the effect of competition and the size of the incentives on subjects’ guesses to assess in aggregate their (dis-)honesty. Participants play a wheel of fortune game. The wheel has 11 slices, from A and K. They are asked to guess which letter between A and K that the wheel of fortune will land on. After observing the wheel spin, participants report the letter they guessed. Their payoff will be determined by the number of steps (counting clockwise) they have to take from the letter they spun to the letter they guessed. If the letter they spun is the same letter they guessed of they receive the maximum payment. Otherwise, they receive the maximum payment minus a certain amount of money for each step they have to take.
Participants are randomly assigned to one of 6 treatments which are implemented in a 3x2 between subjects design. The first dimension varies the size of the incentives, the second dimension how the winner is chosen in a group of 10. (1) The maximum payment is $10 and participants have to subtract $1 for each step they have to take, 1 out of 10 participant is randomly chosen for payment. (2) The maximum payment is $5 and participants have to subtract $0.5 for each step they have to take, 1 out of 10 participant is randomly chosen for payment. (3) The maximum payment is $1 and participants have to subtract $0.1 for each step they have to take, 1 out of 10 participant is randomly chosen for payment. (4) The maximum payment is $10 and participants have to subtract $1 for each step they have to take, the participant with the highest earning among 10 is chosen for payment. (2) The maximum payment is $5 and participants have to subtract $0.5 for each step they have to take, the participant with the highest earning among 10 is chosen for payment. (3) The maximum payment is $1 and participants have to subtract $0.1 for each step they have to take, the participant with the highest earning among 10 is chosen for payment.
After the wheel of fortune game, we elicit participants’ demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender, country of birth; education, race, ethnicity). Participants will be recruited via Qualtrics subject pool. Task payment will be delivered via Paypal.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization by survey software (Qualtrics)
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
NA
Observations
180
Arms
30 per treatment
Primary outcomes
We will compare the distribution of guesses both against the fair random benchmark and across treatments.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords