The Signals We Give: Gender, Feedback, and Competition

How to cite

Coutts, Alexander; Murad, Zahra; Koh, Boon Han. 2020. "The Signals We Give: Gender, Feedback, and Competition." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005543. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5543-3.0

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Alexander Coutts* , Zahra Murad , Boon Han Koh

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005543
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5543-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Withdrawn
Trial dates
2020-03-06 – 2020-08-31
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5543

Abstract

Women are underrepresented in leadership positions across many contexts in both private and public spheres. The proposed research programme aims to study one of the potential barriers to gender equality by examining the biases that managers hold when providing feedback to their employees. Biases in feedback communication can be detrimental to employees’ self-confidence, which may in turn reduce their willingness to compete for promotions or roles with better career prospects. Hence, understanding these biases and their impact on behaviour is an important first step to breaking down the barriers inhibiting women from taking up leadership roles. Using a controlled lab experiment, we will examine whether managers provide feedback differently to employees based on their gender. Our experimental design will allow us to examine the relationship between feedback provision and managers’ own incentives, and the impact that biased performance feedback may have on employees’ behaviour and outcomes.

Experimental design

See detailed design below.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomized matching of managers to male versus female workers. This is done by z-tree to ensure balanced matching within each session.
Randomization unit
There are no treatments.
Clusters
The data is not clustered.
Observations
240 individuals
Arms
There are no treatments.
Primary outcomes
For managers: Beliefs about worker's rank (pre- and post-feedback). Beliefs about worker's preference for piece-rate versus tournament. Informativeness of feedback (exact reported rank, top/bottom half, no rank information) sent to worker. Positivity of message sent to worker. For workers: Beliefs about own rank (pre- and post-feedback). Preferences for piece-rate versus tournament.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords