How a norm-nudge affects group decisions in a social dilemma experiment
How to cite
Diekert, Florian. 2020. "How a norm-nudge affects group decisions in a social dilemma experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005542. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5542-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Research that leverages social norms to induce desirable behaviour has generally studied norm-based interventions when decisions are made by individuals. However, in reality decisions are often made by groups. This is particular true for natural resource use in developing countries.
With our experiment, we aim to build a bridge between the lab and the field to inform policy makers whether a norm-nudge could improve resource management at Lake Victoria, Tanzania.
We study the effect of norm-nudges by varying whether participants are given social information about past behavior of other groups.
Groups in our experiment are recruited from fishing crews.
At Lake Victoria, there are two relevant forms of decision making on board.
Decisions are either made by all crew members together (majority) or by a captain (representative).
Thus, we study the effect of a norm-nudge both when group action is determined by majority, or by a randomly selected representative.
Experimental design
The experiment is a repeated two-team prisoner's dilemma game with disapproval. The prisoner's dilemma is played with a binary choice set, framed as a decision to take points from a collective account or to leave points in a collective account. Three participants play together in a team. Two teams form a collective and share an account with eight points. Both teams can either take four points from the collective account (defect) or leave the points in the collective account (cooperate). Moves are made simultaneously. The remaining points increase and are then distributed equally. For four points left in the collective account, both teams receive three points, i.e. a marginal per agent return of 0.75.
Our treatment variation crosses an empirical norm nudge with two forms of group decision making processes. We first vary whether participants are given social information about past behaviour of other groups. Second, we impose that group decisions are either determined by a majority or by a randomly chosen representative.
Design details
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