On the impact of discrimination on job search
How to cite
Horvath, Gergely. 2020. "On the impact of discrimination on job search." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005485. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5485-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project studies the impact of taste-based discrimination on the job search behavior (reservation wages, search effort) of individuals. The project is based on a lab-style experiment that will be carried out online. We create an infinite horizon search environment whereby participants sequentially search for offers randomly drawn from a known distribution. At the beginning of the experiment participants are randomly assigned to one of two artificial groups. In the baseline treatment, there is no difference between the job search environment of the two groups. In comparison, we introduce two treatments that allow us to study the impact of discrimination. In these treatments one of the random groups faces an adverse search environment: with a certain probability their offers are discounted by a certain amount (the discrimination coefficient). In the simple version of the discrimination treatment, individuals will not know whether their offer was discounted and they decide about acceptance of offers without this knowledge. In the choice version of the discrimination treatment, they will know if their offer was discounted and they can choose whether they accept discriminated offers. In addition, we vary the different parameters of the search environment.
The aim is to study the impact of discrimination on the search effort, reservation wages, obtained wages of workers. For this we compare the baseline treatment to the discrimination treatments. We are also interested in how much percentage of the workers end up working for discriminating employers (that is discounted offers) in the discrimination treatments. We compare the experimental results to the theoretical prediction of risk-neutral optimal search models.
Experimental design
The experiment consists of several rounds, in each round an individual participates in an infinite horizon search environment. This means that within each round there is a random number of periods, with a fixed continuation probability. At the beginning of each period, participants start to search for an offer. They specify a search effort level and a reservation wage. The search effort level determines the probability of receiving an offer, higher effort is more costly which is paid out of an endowment. The reservation wage is the minimum acceptable offer. Then the computer determines if each participant receives an offer or not, and if yes, it randomly draws the offer from a known distribution. As long as the individual receives an acceptable offer, the search is over for the given round. Otherwise, the individual searches again in the next period, if there is one. This sequence of events is repeated in each period. Individuals receive the total payoff from a randomly chosen round.
In the Baseline treatment, participants are randomly drawn into two artificial groups, but there is no meaningful difference between the two groups. In the Discrimination treatments, one of the groups faces a worse distribution of offers: with some probability their offers are discounted by a certain amount. In one of the discrimination treatments participants do not know whether their offer was discounted and specify their search without this knowledge. In another treatment they are aware of discounting and can choose not to accept discounted offers.
Design details
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