Infinitely Repeated Games with Changing Discount Rates: An Experimental Study.
How to cite
Cooper, David; Gentry, Matt. 2020. "Infinitely Repeated Games with Changing Discount Rates: An Experimental Study.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005481. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5481-1.4000000000000001
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Most formal studies of infinitely repeated games assume a fixed discount rate, but it is clear that discount rates vary over time. This changes the dynamic incentives faced by agents and should therefore affect cooperation rates. We are particularly interested in two questions: with changing discount rates, will subjects account for the change in dynamic incentives? Will behavior change beyond what can be explained by changing dynamic incentives? On the latter question, existing research on coordination games leads us to conjecture that cooperation rates will converge to high levels regardless of the current discount rate.
Intervention
Most formal studies of infinitely repeated games assume a fixed discount rate, but it is clear that discount rates vary over time. This changes the dynamic incentives faced by agents and should therefore affect cooperation rates. We are particularly interested in two questions: with changing discount rates, will subjects account for the change in dynamic incentives? Will behavior change beyond what can be explained by changing dynamic incentives? On the latter question, existing research on coordination games leads us to conjecture that cooperation rates will converge to high levels regardless of the current discount rate.
Experimental design
We plan to conduct laboratory experiments systematically studying the effects of varying discount rates in supergames.
Design details
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