Persistent prejudice: De-biasing and the demand for biased news
How to cite
Blattman, Christopher; Kumar, Chinmaya; Bursztyn, Leonardo. 2020. "Persistent prejudice: De-biasing and the demand for biased news." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005468. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5468-4.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Identity groups often hold incorrect and biased beliefs about competing groups. Examples include Democrats and Republicans in the US, or Israelis and Arabs in the Middle East. In India, the setting for this study, Hindu nationalists commonly believe that Muslims are untrustworthy, or that the Muslim population is growing so fast that their population will overtake Hindus. These beliefs may be persistent and difficult to correct. Why is that? One reason, we hypothesize, is that people exposed to information counter to their group identity may work to rebias themselves by increasing their selective exposure--their consumption of biased news and information. We design an experiment in which we randomly provide Hindu respondents with information to correct a biased belief about Muslims, using informational videos. We first confirm that the videos shift their beliefs during the experiment. We then examine their demand for new information—having been de-biased, are they more likely to seek information from a biased source?
Experimental design
Study participants will be recruited through an online survey firm targeting Indians in Hindi-speaking states. Our sample of interest is individuals with strong anti-Muslim sentiments. We use several attitudinal questions to create an index of anti-Muslim bias ranging from 0-12. We aim to recruit 1,000 respondents with a bias score of 8 or more. Given the difficulty of recruiting this sample, it is possible that we will not be able to reach our target N. As such, we will pool data from our small pilot study in our main specification (N = 42). If after pooling we are unable to reach our target sample size, we will include respondents with slightly lower bias scores.
After collecting simple demographic questions and passing attention-check/screening questions, participants are randomized into seeing either the two treatment videos or two placebo videos on trust or population.
- Trust Treatment: The trust game is briefly explained, and participants are told that Muslims return all money twice as often as Hindus.
- Trust Placebo: The trust game is briefly explained, and participants are told nothing about the behavior of Hindus or Muslims.
- Population Treatment: The video debunks the myth that the Muslim population could overtake the Hindu population in India.
- Population Placebo: Participants are provided with information about Buddhist population trends in India.
Then, the posterior belief outcomes are elicited (a secondary outcome).
We measure demand for selective exposure -- news subscription for journalists with biased vs. unbiased stances (primary outcome).
We hypothesize that:
- After treatment, if participants exhibit motivated reasoning (in the sense of experiencing disutility from revising their negative views about Muslims), then they will be more likely to select into the biased/pro-Hindu news subscription, or at least no more likely to select away from it.
- People will immediately update their posteriors to reflect the information they have been given in the treatment (secondary outcome)
In addition to this primary analysis, we will also collect data on a random sample of respondents with a bias score below this cutoff, and examine treatment effects by level of bias (i.e. heterogeneity analysis by bias).
Design details
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