Quality verification in markets with reputation: Theory and experiment

How to cite

Knutsen, Magnus Våge. 2020. "Quality verification in markets with reputation: Theory and experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005404. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5404-1.0

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Magnus Våge Knutsen*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005404
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5404-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-08-18 – 2020-11-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91, C73
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5404

Abstract

I investigate the interaction between two potential solutions to the moral hazard problem in markets for experience goods: quality verification and reputation building. I set up a dynamic quality choice model where short-lived buyers chose between a trusting and a distrusting action, and where a long-lived seller chooses between acting trustworthy or not. Through the presence of commitment behavioral types and the ability of buyers to observe the history of the seller, the seller can build and maintain a reputation. I extend this framework by letting buyers verify product quality at a cost. Contrary to what might be expected, the ability to verify product quality may hurt buyers. The reason is twofold. First, the ability to verify limits the ability of buyers to credibly commit to punishing distrusting behavior. Second, verification limits the ability of buyers to learn about the seller type from observation of previous actions. I implement a lab experiment to test the empirical content of the model.

Intervention

I set up repeated quality choice game where buyers can observe the seller's history. I exogenous vary the opportunity of buyers to verify quality at a cost before they chose whether or not to purchase.

Experimental design

I employ a between subjects design where I vary the ability of buyers to verify product quality.

Observational unit: average behavior in blocks of 5 subjects. Subjects are kept within blocks and unique subjects are used in all treatments.

Random matching of subjects within a block in each new game.

Design details

Randomization method
Random matching of pairs done by computer software in the lab.
Randomization unit
Blocks of 5 subjects.
Clusters
14 blocks
Observations
70 subjects
Arms
7 blocks in each treatment.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome measure is the role of reputation. This is measured as the share of buyers who purchase from a seller with a history of high quality less the share of buyers who purchase from a seller with a history of low quality.
Secondary outcomes
Quality choice of sellers.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords