Diverse Committees

How to cite

Mengel, Friederike; Hughes, Niall; Khan, Zia Ul Hassan. 2020. "Diverse Committees." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005402. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5402-1.1

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Friederike Mengel* , Niall Hughes , Zia Ul Hassan Khan

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005402
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5402-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-02-10 – 2020-03-31
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Essex)
JEL codes
C92; D71
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5402

Abstract

A popular argument in favour of diversity in committees is that different groups might have access to different information. Hence, by omitting some groups this information might be lost to the committee.

We study committee decision making when there is possible correlation between the information held by members of the same group. If people fail to properly account for this correlation, then decision making in homogeneous (non-diverse) committees might be substantially worse. We provide theoretical predictions for four scenarios differing by whether information of members of the same group is correlated or not and whether members of different groups have identical preferences over outcomes or not and then test these using a laboratory experiment.

Experimental design

Participants in our experiment are randomly assigned to either of two groups, S or T. They answer a pre-experimental questionnaire, play 12 rounds of the game described below and then answer a post-experimental questionnaire.
In each round of the experiment participants will (i) receive a signal, (ii) discuss (via a chat window) with their committee members and (iii) vote in committees of three participants about which of two urns (yellow or purple) was selected at the beginning of the round.
Treatments differ according to whether the signal received at stage (i) is correlated among members of the same group or not. They also differ by the payments received when voting correctly. In some treatments both groups prefer the purple state. In some treatments preferences are not aligned with one group preferring the purple state and one group the yellow state.

Design details

Randomization method
participants register for sessions without knowing what session is about. assignment of sessions to treatments is done in the office by computer.
Randomization unit
experimental session
Clusters
32 sessions.
Observations
864 individuals.
Arms
8 sessions per treatment.
Primary outcomes
(i) Committee decisions (dummy indicating whether committee decision was correct); (ii) individual guesses (dummy indicating whether they were correct)
Secondary outcomes
Expected payoffs of committee members of different types.

Papers from this trial

  1. Hughes, Niall and Khan, Zia UH and Mengel, Friederike, Diversity in Committees (June 29, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4495035 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4495035 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4495035

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords