Information Frictions in Government-Firm Relationships

How to cite

Colonnelli, Emanuele. 2020. "Information Frictions in Government-Firm Relationships." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005400. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5400-1.3

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Emanuele Colonnelli*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005400
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5400-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-04-01 – 2022-08-31
Countries
Uganda ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5400

Abstract

Public procurement of goods and services represents the primary area of government investment, accounting for a large share of the GDP in low-income countries. As a result, its potential as a driver of private sector development is massive. Yet, frictions in the functioning of procurement markets can lead to low competition, potentially resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources. Our project aims to estimate various information-related interventions that have been conducted in collaboration with the Uganda Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA), i.e. the national public procurement supervisory agency. Here, we test whether an intervention aiming to increase transparency of public procurement opportunities affects firm-level outcomes.

Intervention

We conduct two interventions aimed at reducing information-related frictions on both sides of the procurement market. First, on the firm-side, we study whether making information about tenders available in a timely and efficient manner affects firm-level outcomes. Second, on the government side, our treatment provides public entities with access to a large pool of data about potential providers.

Experimental design

We use strata for firm location (Kampala vs other), sector (works, supply, services), and size (above and below sample median). Out of 3,049 firms, 765 are allocated to T1 (tender information), 761 to T2 (tender information plus nudge), and 1,523 to the control group. We use strata for public entity type (central, local) and for size based on number of contracts assigned (large, small). Out of 260 public entities, 131 are allocated to treatment (access to database of firms) and 129 to control.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is done in office using Stata. We use strata for firm location (Kampala vs other), sector (works, supply, services), and size (above and below sample median). We use strata for public entity type (central, local) and for size based on number of contracts assigned (large, small).
Randomization unit
The unit is the "firm" for the firm-level intervention and the "public entity" for the public entity intervention.
Clusters
3,049 firms, 260 public entities.
Observations
3,049 firms, 260 public entities.
Arms
Out of 3,049 firms, 765 are allocated to T1 (tender information), 761 to T2 (tender information plus nudge), and 1,523 to the control group. Out of 260 public entities, 131 are allocated to treatment (access to database of firms) and 129 to control.
Primary outcomes
See attached pdf. Our main firm-level outcomes are the bidding and winning behavior in public procurement, as well as measure of firm activity. Our main PDE-level outcomes are measures of competition (overall and new firms winning and bidding, HHI, share top X firms) and the quality/efficiency of executed contracts (delays, cost over-runs, audit outcomes, our own/expert quality checks, value for money a la Bandiera et al (2009)).

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Keywords