Is there a link between wealth inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools
How to cite
Gruener, Sven. 2020. "Is there a link between wealth inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005399. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5399-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This paper investigates experimentally the relationship between inequality in initial wealth and deception. Our basic design is adopted from Gneezy (2005): two players interact in a deception game. It is common knowledge that player 1 has private information about the payoffs for both players of two alternative actions. Player 1 sends a message to player 2, indicating which alternative putatively will end up in a higher payoff for player 2. The message, which can either be true or false, does not affect the payoffs of the players. Player 2 has no information about the payoffs. However, player 2 selects one of the two alternatives A or B, which is payoff-relevant for both players. We extend Gneezy (2005) by two elements. First, we systematically vary the initial wealth of the players 1 and 2 (common knowledge to both of them). Second, we do not limit ourselves to the standard population of university students but also recruit chess players that are not enrolled in any degree program. Doing so, we want to find out if our results remain robust over a non-standard subject population which is known to be experienced to some extent in strategic interactions.
Intervention
We extend the basic idea of Gneezy’s (2005) design to systematic variations in wealth. Altogether, we examine 3 scenarios (1 reference scenario and 2 treatment scenarios; Table 2). While there is no variation of the initial wealth in the reference scenario (both players have €0 initial wealth), treatment 1 provides player 1 with a surplus in initial wealth and treatment 2 provides player 2 a surplus. Player 1 and player 2 know that the initial wealth in the respective treatments is common knowledge to both players.
Experimental design
The basic structure of the experiment is adopted from Gneezy’s (2005) 2-person deception game. Two players play against each other in a one-shot experiment. We extend the basic idea of Gneezy’s (2005) design to systematic variations in wealth as well as a comparison of students and chess players.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Gruener, S., & Khassine, I. (2020, April 6). Is there a link between endowment inequality and deception? – An experimental analysis of different subject pools. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/rmzn4 https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/rmzn4/
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