Piracy in Agriculture

How to cite

Seither, Julia; Lema, Daniel; Backstrom, Jesse; Ye, Karen J.. 2020. "Piracy in Agriculture." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005386. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5386-1.0

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Julia Seither* , Daniel Lema , Jesse Backstrom , Karen J. Ye

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005386
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5386-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-12-01 – 2021-06-30
Countries
Argentina ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5386

Abstract

In markets where the protection of intellectual property cannot be assured through legal enforcement mechanisms, organizations have to resort to norm-based compliance mechanisms. The question how to encourage compliance becomes especially interesting in settings where royalty payments contribute towards research and development in a sector's technological advancement. This is the case for the Argentinian agricultural sector and seed technology research. New seeds research is typically financed through a royalty scheme: farmers that re-use seeds in a subsequent agricultural season are asked to pay royalties on the amount of farm-produced seeds. These amounts are self-reported, not verifiable, and reporting cannot be enforced by law. Currently, less than 20% of farmers report re-planting and pay royalties. This is despite a seemingly wide-spread norm that condemns misreporting and thus piracy in agricultural seed R&D. With this project we test several alternative explanations that could drive piracy in agriculture. Specifically, we estimate the importance of attention and present bias, aversion towards private providers of R&D, and moral consistency. We conduct a randomized field experiment with the entire population of wheat and soybean farmers in Argentina and follow them over the course of one agricultural season.

Experimental design

We will conduct two field experiments with independent samples that will inform us about potential mechanisms against piracy in agriculture.

In a first experiment we will test whether farmers are conscious of their piracy behavior by calling their attention to the implicit contract they sign when purchasing seeds for the first time. We will randomly allocated half of all distribution centers in Argentina that sell wheat seeds to a treatment group - these distribution centers serve approximately 12,700 farmers. Farmers in the treatment group will be handed a flyer with their bill that calls attention to the royalty scheme they have agreed to buy purchasing this bag.

In a second experiment we will estimate the effects of different treatments during the annual communication efforts regarding royalty payments on soybean farmers. The sample for the second experiment will consist of around 30.000 individuals. A control group will receive the standard communication that loosely talks about the importance of royalty payments for R&D in seed technology. There will be three distinct treatment groups.
Treatment 1: Farmers in this group will additionally receive information about the importance of royalty payments for their personal future and agricultural success.
Treatment 2: Farmers in this group will be informed that 20% of the royalties they pay will fund an independent research prize on seed technology instead of being paid out to private seed producer companies.
Treatment 3: Farmers in this group will be reminded of their own moral standing regarding seed piracy before being asked to declare their royalty amount.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be done in the office by a computer. For the first experiment randomization will occur on the level of the distribution center. The second experiment will be randomized at the individual level.
Randomization unit
The first experiment will be randomized at the distribution center level. The second experiment will be randomized at the individual level.
Clusters
For the first experiment there will be 683 clusters (distribution centers).
Observations
The first experiment will include approximately 12,700 farmers in 683 clusters whereas the second experiment includes around 30,000 farmers.
Arms
We will randomly allocate 342 distribution centers to the treatment group and 341 to the control group for the first experiment. For the second experiment, we will randomize 1/4 of the sample into each group.
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcomes are the compliance of farmers regarding royalty payments both at the extensive and the intensive margin.

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Keywords