Exchanging Private Information to Sustain Cooperation in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions

How to cite

Fehrler, Sebastian; Dvorak, Fabian; Bao, Yongping. 2020. "Exchanging Private Information to Sustain Cooperation in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005369. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5369-1.1

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Sebastian Fehrler* , Fabian Dvorak , Yongping Bao

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005369
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5369-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-02-03 – 2020-07-31
Countries
Germany (Konstanz)
JEL codes
C72, C73, C92, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5369

Abstract

We study the role of exchanging private information in a noisy indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect monitoring for cooperation in a laboratory experiment. The laboratory environment allows us to tightly control opportunities to communicate, whether signals are private or public, and the correlation structure of the signals. Controlling these factors allows us to address the following research questions:

What is the causal effect of the opportunity to report private information on the cooperation between participants? What is the role of the correlation structure for this effect? To what extend does the opportunity to report private information mitigate the problems associated with private monitoring? To what extend do experimental participants exploit the information contained in the correlation of signals?

Intervention

We vary the correlation and communication structure in a between-subject design.

Experimental design

We implement up to five different treatments varying the correlation and communication structure in a between-subject design.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of the treatments in the lab.
Randomization unit
Experimental session
Clusters
45 matching groups
Observations
360
Arms
120
Primary outcomes
The average cooperation rate in the last three supergames.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords