Exchanging Private Information to Sustain Cooperation in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
How to cite
Fehrler, Sebastian; Dvorak, Fabian; Bao, Yongping. 2020. "Exchanging Private Information to Sustain Cooperation in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005369. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5369-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study the role of exchanging private information in a noisy indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect monitoring for cooperation in a laboratory experiment. The laboratory environment allows us to tightly control opportunities to communicate, whether signals are private or public, and the correlation structure of the signals. Controlling these factors allows us to address the following research questions:
What is the causal effect of the opportunity to report private information on the cooperation between participants? What is the role of the correlation structure for this effect? To what extend does the opportunity to report private information mitigate the problems associated with private monitoring? To what extend do experimental participants exploit the information contained in the correlation of signals?
Intervention
We vary the correlation and communication structure in a between-subject design.
Experimental design
We implement up to five different treatments varying the correlation and communication structure in a between-subject design.
Design details
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