An Experiment on Information Avoidance with Respect to Intention

How to cite

Friedrichsen, Jana; Piasenti, Stefano; Momsen, Katharina. 2020. "An Experiment on Information Avoidance with Respect to Intention." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005368. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5368-1.0

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Jana Friedrichsen* , Stefano Piasenti , Katharina Momsen

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005368
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5368-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-02-11 – 2021-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5368

Abstract

We seek to investigate how decision makers take the intention of another decision maker and the outcome of her choice into account when choosing a reciprocating action. We vary if decision makers observe their partner’s action or only the outcome of the decision. We ask if decision makers are willing to reveal the action of their partner –his intention –or if they prefer to remain uninformed. If decision makers feel obliged to reward good intentions, they might prefer to remain ignorant about their partner’s action and exploit their willful ignorance by acting selfishly. We further explore how decision makers incorporate their partner’s action and the outcome of her actions into their own decisions when both are observable.

Experimental design

We seek to investigate how decision makers take the intention of another decision maker and the outcome of her choice into account when choosing a reciprocating action. We vary if decision makers observe their partner’s action or only the outcome of the decision. We ask if decision makers are willing to reveal the action of their partner –his intention –or if they prefer to remain uninformed. If decision makers feel obliged to reward good intentions, they might prefer to remain ignorant about their partner’s action and exploit their willful ignorance by acting selfishly. We further explore how decision makers incorporate their partner’s action and the outcome of her actions into their own decisions when both are observable.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects from the subject pool sign up for sessions without knowing which treatment is run. In this sense, allocation to treatment is random.
Randomization unit
experimental sessions
Clusters
12 experimental sessions in Berlin and 8 experimental sessions in Potsdam
Observations
264 subjects in Berlin and 160 subjects in Potsdam
Arms
Berlin: 3 sessions for full information and 9 sessions for hidden information Potsdam: 2 sessions for full information and 6 sessions for hidden information In case of an unexpectedly high number of no-shows, we will run additional sessions in Potsdam and/or Berlin to reach the planned number of observations.
Primary outcomes
• frequency of player 1 choosing the high investment • average donation by player 2 (conditional on high outcome and high investment and low outcome and high investment) • compare average donation by player 2 between different investment decisions conditional on outcome (only in full info treatment) • compare average donation by player 2 between different outcomes conditional on investment decisions (only in full info treatment) • compare frequency of player 2 choosing to learn player 1’s decision between decisions where outcome is low and decisions where outcome is high • We also elicit beliefs about choices of player 1 and risk preferences and will use these in a regression-based approach to understand decisions of player 2.
Secondary outcomes
• average donation by player 2 (between treatments) • compare the average informed (self-selected vs. exogenous) donation by player 2 conditional on high outcome and high investment • compare the average informed (self-selected vs. exogenous) donation by player 2 conditional on low outcome and high investment • compare average donation by player 2 given a high outcome conditional on player 1's investment when informed vs. uninformed (only in hidden information treatment)

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Keywords