An Agent-based Credit Delivery Model

How to cite

Maitra, Pushkar; Mitra, Sandip; Mookherjee, Dilip; Visaria, Sujata. 2020. "An Agent-based Credit Delivery Model." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005366. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5366-1.0

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Pushkar Maitra* , Sandip Mitra , Dilip Mookherjee , Sujata Visaria

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005366
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5366-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2010-11-01 – 2013-08-01
Countries
India (West Bengal)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5366

Abstract

We designed and evaluated a randomized credit intervention where the task of borrower selection was delegated to local intermediaries. In one intervention, named Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending, a randomly selected local private trader was appointed as the agent. In the other intervention, named Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated Lending (GRAIL), the local village council selected the agent. Agents were incentivized through repayment-dependent commissions to select creditworthy clients and to enforce loan repayment. These two schemes were compared with a group-based lending (GBL) intervention where 5-member groups self-formed and received joint liability loans. We collected household survey data at 4-month intervals to evaluate the impact of these schemes on farm cultivation decisions, output and profits.

Experimental design

We worked in 72 villages in two districts of West Bengal, India. Twenty-four villages were assigned to the TRAIL, GRAIL and GBL interventions each. In each TRAIL or GRAIL village, a single individual (either a trader or a political appointee) was appointed agent and asked to recommend 30 village residents who owned less than 1.5 acres of cultivable land. Ten of these 30 were randomly selected to receive the individual liability loans. The agent received as commission 75% of the interest paid by borrowers they had recommended. In the villages assigned to the GBL intervention, village residents owning less than 1.5 acres of land were invited to self-form 5-member groups. Of the groups that survived the 6-month initiation period, two were randomly selected to receive joint liability loans. All loans in all 3 interventions were offered at 6 percent interest for a 4-month duration, repayable in a single lumpsum. We conducted 4-monthly household surveys with 50 households in each village to assess the impacts on the following outcomes: (i) cultivation decisions and input choices, output, revenue, costs and profits, especially for potatoes (ii) loan take-up, continuation and repayment rates.

Design details

Randomization method
Villages were randomly selected by drawing randomly from a set of village councils in 2 districts of West Bengal. Villages were randomized into each of the treatment arms - randomization conducted in our office by a computer. Individuals /groups to receive loan (treatment households) were selected through a public lottery in the presence of a village official.
Randomization unit
1. Village 2. Household
Clusters
72 villages
Observations
50 households in each village. Total sample size of 3600 households.
Arms
24 villages in TRAIL treatment 24 villages in GRAIL treatment 24 villages in GBL treatment
Primary outcomes
The outcomes of interest were: (i) cultivation decisions and input choices, output, revenue, costs and profits, especially for potatoes (ii) loan take-up, continuation and repayment rates.

Cited by

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Keywords