Pollution, Productivity and Willingness to Pay for Defensive Investments

How to cite

Jagnani, Maulik; Garg, Teevrat. 2020. "Pollution, Productivity and Willingness to Pay for Defensive Investments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005364. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5364-4.0

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Maulik Jagnani* , Teevrat Garg

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005364
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5364-4.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2020-01-15 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Bangladesh (Dhaka)
JEL codes
Q50, Q56, Q58, Q53, O13, O10
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5364

Abstract

Air quality has become a pressing concern in many developing countries, particularly in South Asia. The 2019 State of Global Air study found that in South Asia, air quality levels represented a loss of 2-3 years in average life expectancy. In Bangladesh, where we propose our study, it was estimated that 200,000 people died in 2017 due to poor air quality. While the human capital costs of air pollution have been documented extensively, there remain major gaps in our understanding of the effects of air pollution and more importantly the ability and willingness of individuals and firms to avoid these damages. We propose a field experiment with randomized allocation of air purifiers in small-scale textile firms in Bangladesh to estimate the effect of air pollution on worker productivity as well as willingness to pay for defensive investments that help reduce exposure to air pollution.

Experimental design

Our research design has two parts: the first part will estimate the effect of pollution on productivity (N = 100 firms); the second part will examine the willingness-to-pay for air pollution purifiers (N = 2500 firms).

Part 1: In the first part, we will randomly sample 100 firms and install air quality monitors in each firm. We will install air purifiers in 50 randomly selected firms for a period of 12 months (treatment group). In our analysis, we will compare productivity indicators between the treatment and control group to estimate the impact of air filters on productivity.

Part 2: In the second part, we will randomly sample 2500 firms.

Baseline Survey Visit: Surveyors will visit 2500 firms and speak to both the factory owner about pollution: Surveyors will conduct a survey, which will include a module on pollution and beliefs about outdoor and indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity, and the protective effects of air purifiers.

Intervention:

Treatment Group 1: Owners across a random sample of garment factories (firms) in Dhaka informed about indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity, and the protective effects of air purifiers (from Intervention #1).

Treatment Group 2: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be provided access to credit to purchase air purifiers.

Treatment Group 3: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be provided access to a free two-year maintenance contract for the air purifier.

Treatment Group 4: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be told that they could return the air purifier and get their money back if they don't want to keep it after a month of use.

Treatment Group 5: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be told that they only need to pay for the air purifier if they want to keep it after a month of use.

Treatment Group 6: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 2
Treatment Group 7: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 3
Treatment Group 8: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 4
Treatment Group 9: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 5

Willingness-to-Pay Experiment: At the end, factory owners will be asked to take part in a real-stakes willingness-to-pay experiment; we will elicit willingness to pay for air purifiers using an incentive-compatible Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism.

In our analysis, we will simply compare willingness-to-pay estimates across owners in the treatment and control groups.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Unit of randomization: garment factories (firms)
Clusters
Intervention #1: 100 firms Intervention #2: 2500 firms
Observations
Intervention #1: 2000 workers Intervention #2: 2500 firm owners
Arms
Intervention #1: 50 garment factories/firms in the control group, 50 garment factories/firms in the control group Intervention #2: 250 garment factories/firms in the control group, 250 garment factories/firms in each of the 9 treatment groups.
Primary outcomes
productivity indicators and willingness to pay measures

Cited by

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Keywords