The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives

How to cite

Rees-Jones, Alex; Pierce, Lamar. 2020. "The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005362. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5362-1.0

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Alex Rees-Jones* , Lamar Pierce

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005362
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5362-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-01-01 – 2018-01-01
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
D03, D81, J22, J31
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5362

Abstract

Behavioral economists have proposed that loss-averse employees increase productivity when bonuses are "loss framed"---prepaid then clawed back if targets are unmet. We theoretically document that loss framing raises incentives for costly risk mitigation and for inefficient multitasking, potentially leading to large negative performance effects. We empirically document evidence of these concerns in a nationwide field experiment among 294 car dealers. Dealers randomized into loss-framed (but financially identical) contracts sold 5% fewer vehicles than control dealers, generating a revenue loss of $45 million over 4 months. We discuss implications regarding the use of behavioral economics to motivate both employees and firms.

Intervention

Car manufacturers commonly provide bonus payments to car dealers based on the number of cars sold in a month.

The intervention we consider modifies the timing of payment in a manner intended to make participants feel a sense of loss if the bonus is not earned.

Prior to the intervention, as well as in the control arm during the experiment, the number of cars sold was assessed at the end of the month. Bonus payments were made shortly thereafter.

In the intervention, it was assumed that the dealer would sell enough cars to reach a particular point that grants a large, fixed bonus, and this amount was paid at the beginning of the month. If, at the end of the month, sales were insufficient to earn this bonus, the difference was paid back. If excess bonus was due, it was paid at that time.

Experimental design

As described above, the key intervention was the random assignment of the timing of bonus payments: they either stayed in the status-quo arrangement of being paid after sales occur, or the were changed to prepayment with the threat of clawback.

This study was conducted throughout 2017. The first four months of 2017 were effectively used as a baseline period (held back as the pre-period in a difference in differences design). The second four months were the primary treatment period, in which approximately half of participating dealers were randomly assigned to treatment. The last four months served as a secondary treatment period, in which treatment and control status is flipped for all participants.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization was conducted at the DMA level, due to concerns that dealers in the same area would be affected by the treatment assignment of their competitors. To maximize the efficacy of a difference in differences design, a bipartite matching procedure was used to create pairs of DMAs that minimized the distance between pairs pre-period sales trends. Within each pair, assignment to treatment and control was then randomized by a computer.
Randomization unit
DMAs.
Clusters
116 DMAs
Observations
294 dealers.
Arms
140 dealers in the initial treatment group, 154 dealers in the initial control group.
Primary outcomes
Number of cars sold per month.

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Keywords