Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the SSI Program
How to cite
Zhang, Yiwei; Weathers, Robert; Metcalfe, Robert; Kessler, Judd; Hemmeter, Jeffrey. 2020. "Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the SSI Program." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005351. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5351-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
There is growing interest in the potential for interventions to motivate behavior in policy settings. We study a large-scale (n=50,000) field experiment implemented by the Social Security Administration on one such “nudge” aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities increased the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the amount of reported earnings in the three months immediately following the intervention by a statistically significant amount. However, this immediate relative effect of the letter decays slightly over time. While we find a robust effect of the reminder letter, the specific content of the letter—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect on behavior. We estimate that the letters generated roughly $18.88 in savings on average per dollar spent.
Intervention
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients are mailed wage reporting reminder letters (with a control group that received no letter) that vary in their inclusion of simple language, providing either
1) simple information about reporting (included on all letters)
2) social information on reporting behavior
3) information increasing the saliency of the penalties for non-compliance, or
4) both social information and information on penalties.
Experimental design
From an experimental sample of 50,000 Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients, individuals were randomly assigned to one of five groups (n = 10,000 per group) :
1. Basic Intervention—a group that was sent a form letter reminding them of the need to report any information about earnings that might affect SSI payment amounts without our behavioral insights language added;
2. Social Information Intervention—a group that was sent a form letter identical to that of the “Basic Intervention” group but included additional information on the overall reporting behavior of SSI recipients (“Over 200,000 persons who receive SSI report new wages to us each month.”);
3. Salience of Penalties Intervention—a group that was sent a form letter identical to that of the “Basic Intervention” group but included additional information on the possible financial penalties that could be incurred if wages are unreported (“If you do not report your wages to us on purpose, we can stop your SSI payments.”);
4. Both Interventions—a group that was sent a form letter identical to that of the “Basic Intervention” group but both contained peer information and made salient the potential financial penalties from failure to report (“Over 200,000 persons who receive SSI report new wages to us each month. If you do not report your wages to us on purpose, we can stop your SSI payments.”); and
5. Control—a group that was not sent a letter and therefore served as a control condition.
Design details
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