How to induce workers to sell high-margin products? A field experiment

How to cite

Gürtler, Oliver; Thon, Max; Sliwka, Dirk; Heinz, Matthias. 2020. "How to induce workers to sell high-margin products? A field experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005347. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5347-1.1

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Oliver Gürtler* , Max Thon , Dirk Sliwka , Matthias Heinz

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005347
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5347-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-02-01 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5347

Abstract

We collaborate with a retail company and investigate changes in the salesworkers' compensation system. In an RCT, we study the effect of assigning higher weights to high-margin products in the determination of workers' compensation. We compare two compensation systems. The first system is solely based on workers' individual performance (i.e., their revenue). In the second system, revenues of high-margin products are assigned higher weights than revenues of low-margin products, and the commission is based on weighted revenue. We study how the different compensation systems affect revenues from the different types of products, turnover, conversion rates (i.e., the rate at which customers being served by salesworkers buy the firm's products), and granted discounts.

Experimental design

We collaborate with a retailer operating 69 stores in Australia and New Zealand. The retailer employs salesworkers whose main task is to sell the firm's products in the stores. In an RCT, two (new) compensation systems are implemented in (about) half of the firm's stores, respectively, and the company has agreed to keep the treatments in the field for at least four months (i.e., until the end of May). The first system is solely based on workers' individual performance (i.e., their revenue). In the second system, revenues of different types of products are assigned different weights, and commission payments are based on weighted revenue. Both compensation schemes are piecewise linear; they have kinks at two pre-specified targets and become steeper once a target is reached. The commission systems are designed such that the average commission is about the same across systems (as calibrated with the 2019 revenue distribution).

Treatment A: Salesworkers' monthly compensation depends on their (unweighted) revenue in that month.

Treatment B: Salesworkers' monthly compensation depends on their weighted revenue in that month. Different weights are assigned to revenues of different types of products, with high-margin products receiving higher weights than low-margin products.

We study how the different compensation systems affect revenues from different types of product, turnover, conversion rates (i.e., the rate at which customers being served by salesworkers buy the firm's products), and granted discounts. We also study heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to workers’ pre-treatment performance (high- vs. low-performers) and tenure. We further conduct employee surveys to measure employee attitudes.

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic the travel agency unfortunately had to close their stores in spring 2020 and the RCT had to be stopped.

Design details

Randomization method
Pairwise matching by revenues in 2019
Randomization unit
The randomization was implemented on the store level.
Clusters
69 stores (51 stores in Australia and 18 stores in New Zealand)
Observations
Actual headcount on the 1st of February (we do not yet have the precise data)
Arms
About half of the stores (35 and 34) in each of the two treatments, respectively
Primary outcomes
Revenue (from different types of product)
Secondary outcomes
Conversion rate by product type, discounts, turnover

Cited by

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Keywords