Individual versus team-based pay - a field experiment

How to cite

Gürtler, Oliver; Thon, Max; Sliwka, Dirk; Heinz, Matthias. 2020. "Individual versus team-based pay - a field experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005345. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5345-1.1

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Oliver Gürtler* , Max Thon , Dirk Sliwka , Matthias Heinz

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005345
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5345-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-02-04 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5345

Abstract

We collaborate with a retail company and investigate changes in the salesworkers' compensation system. In an RCT, we study the effect of different combinations of team and individual incentives on performance. To that end, we implement two new compensation systems. The first system is solely based on workers' individual performance, whereas the second is based on both individual and team performance. We study how the different compensation systems affect revenues, turnover, conversion rates (i.e., the rate at which customers being served by salesworkers buy the firm's products), and granted discounts.

Experimental design

We collaborate with a retailer operating 68 stores in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The retailer employs salesworkers whose main task is to sell the firm's products in the stores. In an RCT, two (new) compensation systems are implemented in half of the firm's stores, respectively, and the company has agreed to keep the treatments in the field for at least four months (i.e., until the end of May). The first system is solely based on workers' individual performance, whereas the second is based on both individual and team performance. The commission systems are designed such that the average commission is about the same across systems (as calibrated with the 2019 revenue distribution).

Treatment A: Salesworkers' monthly compensation depends only on their own revenue in that month. The corresponding compensation scheme is piecewise linear; it has kinks at two pre-specified targets and it becomes steeper once a target is reached.

Treatment B: Salesworkers' monthly compensation depends both on their own revenue in that month and on the total revenue of all workers in their store (with a ratio of about 3 to 1). For each type of revenue (i.e., individual and store revenue), the compensation scheme is piecewise linear; it has kinks at two pre-specified targets and it becomes steeper once a target is reached.

We study how the different compensation systems affect revenues, turnover, conversion rates (i.e., the rate at which customers being served by salesworkers buy the firm's products), and granted discounts. We also study heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to workers’ pre-treatment performance (high- vs. low-performers) and tenure. We further study differences in gaming between treatments. Finally, we conduct employee surveys to measure employee attitudes. In particular, we explore heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to social preferences (as elicited by a survey).

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic the travel agency unfortunately had to close their stores in spring 2020 and the RCT had to be stopped.

Design details

Randomization method
Pairwise matching by revenues in 2019
Randomization unit
The randomization was implemented on the store level.
Clusters
68 stores (7 stores in Austria, 49 stores in Germany and 12 stores in Switzerland)
Observations
Actual headcount on the 4th of February (we do not yet have the precise data)
Arms
Half of the stores (34) in each of the two treatments, respectively
Primary outcomes
Revenue
Secondary outcomes
Conversion rate, discounts, turnover

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords