Pledge and Agree: The Path to Cooperation

How to cite

ARECHAR, ANTONIO; CHEN, CUICUI; ZECKHAUSER, RICHARD. 2020. "Pledge and Agree: The Path to Cooperation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005339. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5339-1.0

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ANTONIO ARECHAR* , CUICUI CHEN , RICHARD ZECKHAUSER

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005339
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5339-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-02-26 – 2020-03-26
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91, D03, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5339

Abstract

The prisoner’s dilemma game has the deeply discouraging implication that cooperation will be impossible to achieve in one-time encounters. Fortunately, players in the real world have found ways to engage in cooperative endeavors in just such situations. Here we argue that parties can solve this dilemma through a two-step tatonnement process where they first pledge their intentions. A deal is reached if there is reciprocal agreement on the pledges and breaking one’s word is more costly than merely not cooperating.
Our analysis accomplishes two goals: First, using traditional game-theoretic tools, we demonstrate that cooperation emerges naturally as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in a pledge-and-agree framework. Often it is the only SPE; in other contexts, its properties make it the logical choice among SPEs. Second, this analysis employs experiments to test whether parties actually reach cooperative outcomes when allowed to pledge and agree before taking action.

Intervention

We invite participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk to take part in an incentivized one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with an anonymous other party. The game is alternatively displayed in the pledge and agree framework outlined above, or in its standard form. Alternative payoffs are also employed. In the two versions, non-agreement is superior to cooperating when the other party does not in one and inferior in the other. Participants will be randomly assigned to alternative conditions.

Experimental design

We have a between-subjects design. We invite participants to take part in an incentivized one-shot game with an anonymous other. Their random assignment will be to one of ten conditions. Two conditions present a standard prisoner's dilemma scenario and establish our baselines for the two sets of payoffs. The remaining eight conditions are variations of the game that incorporate our pledge and agree design, and allow us to experimentally test its predictions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual.
Clusters
1,500 participants.
Observations
1,500 participants.
Arms
150 participants in each of the ten conditions.
Primary outcomes
Overall cooperation across conditions.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords