Public Disclosure and Property Tax Compliance: A Field Experiment in Kampala, Uganda

How to cite

Regan, Tanner; Manwaring, Priya. 2021. "Public Disclosure and Property Tax Compliance: A Field Experiment in Kampala, Uganda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005328. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5328-2.1

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Tanner Regan* , Priya Manwaring

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005328
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5328-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-11-01 – 2022-05-31
Countries
Uganda (Kampala)
JEL codes
R28, R38, H2, H3
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5328

Abstract

Property taxes are an important source of local government revenue. However, compliance rates can be extremely low in some developing country cities. This project studies the effectiveness of policy measures to influence voluntary tax compliance. We consider a specific type of policy intervention: public disclosure of tax compliance. The central question is "Does public disclosure of tax behaviour raise compliance?". We consider two channels of effect through which disclosure could affect compliance. The first is a direct effect; "Do taxpayers change their compliance behaviour when they know that it will be publicised?", and the second is a knock-on effect; "Do tax payers change their behaviour when they are publicly notified of the behaviour of others?". Further, we compare the relative effectiveness of two different types of disclosure: publicly reporting tax delinquents (shaming) and publicly honoring tax compliers. In theory, shaming delinquents could be less effective than honoring compliance. First, honoring compliers may be more effective in a low-compliance equilibrium because shaming provides a relatively uninformative signal when delinquency is very common. Second, honoring compliers may be more effective at creating positive knock-on effects because reports of compliers raises the visibility of good role models while reports of delinquents could demoralise taxpayers. To study these questions we partner with the Kampala Capital City Authority to randomise variations of their proposed tax reporting scheme. In this experiment treatment notifications are administered by text message to roughly 80,000 unique phone numbers associated with roughly 200,000 tax-owing properties.

Intervention

In collaboration with the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), we conduct a randomized evaluation of their 'Enhancing Property Rates Compliance through SMS' intervention. In this experiment, treatments are notifications administered by text message to roughly 80,000 unique phone numbers associated with roughly 200,000 tax-owing properties. There will be two rounds of treatment messages (two interventions). In the first round, taxpayers will be notified whether and how their behaviour will be disclosed. Some will be told that they will be honored publicly if they comply, some will be told that they will be publicly reported if they do not comply, and some will simply be reminded to pay. Then, based on their compliance at the end of the financial year (June), they will have their behaviour disclosed in the way outlined in their treatment message. In the second round, taxpayers will receive the disclosure reports of others' behaviour. Some will receive no report, some will receive reports of delinquents, and some will receive reports of compliers. Following the notifications, compliance will be measured again using administrative records (December). Treatments in the two rounds will be completely cross-randomized. This allows identification of both the direct and knock-on effects of public reporting.

Experimental design

Our experiment randomly assigns properties to treatment groups. Randomization is clustered at the phone number level, so that all properties with the same phone number receive the same treatment. We use machine randomization and treatments are administered digitally.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization unit
The randomization is clustered at the phone number level.
Clusters
62,758 phone numbers
Observations
151,649 properties
Arms
Control:16,692 Phone Numbers Reporting (SMS): 8,386 Phone Numbers Reporting (Web): 8,369 Phone Numbers Recognition (SMS): 8,352 Phone Numbers Recognition (Web): 8,341 Phone Numbers Information (Enforcement): 5,579 Phone Numbers Information (Reciprocity): 5,582 Phone Numbers Information (Relationship Management): 5,576 Phone Numbers
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is tax compliance. There are different ways to measure compliance. To be specific, we define a property as compliant if that property's annual liability is paid before June 30th, 2021 (the end of the financial year).
Secondary outcomes
As a secondary outcome we consider the size of tax payments, i.e. the total sum of payments made towards a property before June 30th, 2021. We will also consider heterogeneity of our primary outcome along two key dimensions: (1) the wealth of the property owner, and (2) perceived norms around tax compliance.

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Keywords