An Experiment on Property Rights and Cheating Behavior

How to cite

Fabbri, Marco; Rizzolli, Matteo. 2020. "An Experiment on Property Rights and Cheating Behavior." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005324. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5324-1.3

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Marco Fabbri* , Matteo Rizzolli

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005324
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5324-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-01-20 – 2020-03-15
Countries
Benin ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5324

Abstract

A well functioning system of property rights is a key component of the rule of law and ultimately of development. An important trend in development policies has emphasized the need to establish formalized property rights of land (De Soto, 2000, Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). However, a well-functioning property rights' system is built both on formal and efficient public institutions that guarantee top-down public enforcement as well as on the bottom-up emergence of coordination on the Hume's property convention where people find it privately convenient to respect each others entitlements (Sugden, 1989, Fabbri et al., 2019). An effective property system thus blends third-party enforcement of formal titles with second-party enforcement, (social norms whereby owners are willing to fight to defend and enforce their entitlements) and first-party enforcement (moral norms suggesting non-owners to resist cheating). The interplay between the formalization of property rights and the development of moral norms is the subject of the present research project. Indeed there is a growing experimental literature studying preferences for truth-telling (Abeler et al., 2019) and showing how resistance to cheating is a very robust moral norm. In this project, we study whether an institutional reform formalizing land's rights carried out ten years before influenced individuals' moral norms suggesting to resist cheating.

Intervention

See attached pre-analysis plan.

Experimental design

We will run a lab-in-the-field experiment that uses a standard dice-rolling task modelled on the Fischbacher and F ̈ollmi-Heusi (2013): subjects privately observe the outcome of a dice roll, report the outcome and receive a monetary payoff proportional to their report.

Design details

Randomization method
In office done by a computer.
Randomization unit
Village
Clusters
32
Observations
576
Arms
288
Primary outcomes
Self-reported outcome of a dice rolled in private.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords