An Experiment on Institutions and Theories of Property

How to cite

Fabbri, Marco; Rizzolli, Matteo; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe. 2020. "An Experiment on Institutions and Theories of Property." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005320. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5320-1.2000000000000002

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Marco Fabbri* , Matteo Rizzolli , Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005320
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5320-1.2000000000000002
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-01-21 – 2020-03-15
Countries
Benin ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5320

Abstract

Respecting others' property rights in situations where state enforcement or decentralized enforcing institutions are absent is an important component of social preferences. A burgeoning experimental literature has identified this unenforced respect for property rights and labelled it ``taking aversion" or ``first party enforcement" (Faillo et al., 2019). In this project, we investigate the effects that property rights have on taking aversion. More specifically, we study whether the source that originated the property rights (merit or luck) is an important determinant of taking aversion and how the origin of property interacts with property rights institutions. To do so, in a lab-in-the-field experiment we conduct a modified dictator game with taking in which the passive player had either received windfall money or earned the endowment through an effort task (Jakiela, 2011). To achieve identification, we combine the lab-in-the-field game with the setting of property rights reform implemented following a unique strategy in a West African country.

Intervention

See attached pre-analysis plan

Experimental design

We ran a modified dictator game with taking combined with an implementation of a property rights reform. See attached pre-analysis plan.

Design details

Randomization method
In office by computer
Randomization unit
Village
Clusters
32
Observations
576
Arms
288
Primary outcomes
Taking rate of Dictators under different sources of earnings for the passive player. See attached pre-analysis plan.
Secondary outcomes
See attached pre-analysis plan.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords