An Experiment on Property Rights and Coordination

How to cite

Fabbri, Marco; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe. 2020. "An Experiment on Property Rights and Coordination." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005319. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5319-1.2000000000000002

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Marco Fabbri* , Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005319
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5319-1.2000000000000002
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-01-21 – 2020-03-15
Countries
Benin ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5319

Abstract

A key feature of legal systems is to help people to coordinate toward specific behaviors, the so called ``expressive function of the law" (Sunstein, 1996). In this project, we verify whether private property affects coordination in a situation characterized by multiple equilibria. We study a reform of property rights that formalized and registered use rights over land. With the reform, registered land plots can be defended in court against contenders, sold, or used as collateral by land owners. Therefore, the reform introduces a shift from collective and informal land rights to a system akin to private ownership.We test subjects' ability to coordinate using a two-player coordination game characterized by multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategy similar to Jackson and Xing (2014): two asymmetric equilibria characterized by highly inequitable payoffs and one symmetric equilibrium that results in a lower total payoff. We make use of the peculiar implementation of the land rights reform to compare the choices of subjects who experienced land ownership against those who maintained a system of collective and informal land rights.

Intervention

See attached pre-analysis plan

Experimental design

We run a modified battle-of-the-sexes game with an additional symmetric option and we combine it with the peculiar implementation of a property right reform

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization in office
Randomization unit
Village
Clusters
32
Observations
576
Arms
288
Primary outcomes
1) Frequency of coordination in a modified Battle of the Sexes game 2) Payoffs and Gini coefficient
Secondary outcomes
See attached pre-analysis plan

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords