Loss contracts and the effect of ex-ante cash payments on productivity
How to cite
Essl, Andrea; Friedrich, Kathrin; Jaussi, Stefanie; Bieberstein, Frauke von. 2020. "Loss contracts and the effect of ex-ante cash payments on productivity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005303. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5303-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we examine whether ex-ante cash payments as compared to ex-post cash payments affect productivity under a loss contract. In particular, we aim at investigating whether loss contracts induce higher effort provision if participants receive their payment in cash before working on a real-effort task then if participants receive the cash payment after working on the real-effort task.
Intervention
Subjects work under a negatively framed loss contract. Two treatments: In the ex-ante cash treatment, participants receive 15 CHF in cash before working on a real-effort task. In the ex-post cash treatment subjects receive the cash after working on the real-effort task.
Experimental design
Lab experiment. Between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the session level to either the ex-ante cash treatment or the ex-post cash treatment. Participants work on a real-effort task under a negatively framed loss contract. In addition, we elicit individual loss aversion and baseline performance. Finally, participants fill out a non-incentivized questionnaire.
Design details
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