Internal constraints to risk-sharing and demand for insurance: A lab-in-the-field analysis in Ghana

How to cite

Gallenstein, Richard. 2020. "Internal constraints to risk-sharing and demand for insurance: A lab-in-the-field analysis in Ghana." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005290. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5290-1.2000000000000002

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Richard Gallenstein*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005290
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5290-1.2000000000000002
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-01-18 – 2020-08-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D63, D91, O15
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5290

Abstract

Low income households in agrarian developing economies continue to face considerable agricultural and livelihood risks which have serious negative impacts on household welfare. Incomplete insurance markets present an external constraint to risk management and are well studied in the literature. A growing literature has focused on internal constraints to development such as how time inconsistent preferences or aspiration failures can negatively affect saving and investment behavior. Here I propose that internal constraints may also hinder risk management. Specifically, I propose that concerns over fairness that arise in a context of wealth inequality may hinder the development of efficient informal risk management networks and influence the demand for formal insurance products. To test this theory, I utilize a framed field experiment conducted among smallholder farmers in northern Ghana to investigate the role of wealth inequality and fairness on participation in formal and informal risk sharing tools.

Intervention

I conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment among rural households in northern Ghana. The lab experiment is designed to measure participants' views of fairness, willingness to participate in risk-sharing, and demand for insurance in the context of wealth inequality. More details on the design are provided in the attached analysis plan.

Experimental design

A full description of the experiment is provided in detail in the attached analysis plan. Below is a concise summary:

I plan for a sample of roughly 400 participants. These participants will participate in one session that will include roughly 12 total participants. Each session will include three experimental games. In each game, participant will begin with some initial endowment which they must invest in a business venture. The outcome of their investment will be determine by a draw from a bag that contains 10 painted wooden balls with one color indicating success and the other failure. The first game measures risk preferences, the second game measures fairness preferences, and the third game measures participants' willingness to manage risk through insurance or informal risk sharing.

Design details

Randomization method
All randomization procedures during the lab experiment are conducted using draws of different colored wooden balls from black bags by participants in the experiment.
Randomization unit
Individual.
Clusters
550 individual.
Observations
I will play 3 games with roughly 8 round per game. With 550 participants, I plan to have a total number of observations of roughly 13,200.
Arms
Each participant will play each game in my experiment.
Primary outcomes
Participation in Risk-Sharing. Self allocation of group income. Decision to purchase insurance

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords