Participation in Regulatory Drafting and Downstream Compliance

How to cite

Malesky, Edmund; Taussig, Markus. 2014. "Participation in Regulatory Drafting and Downstream Compliance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000529. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.529-4.0

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Edmund Malesky* , Markus Taussig

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000529
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.529-4.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2014-10-26 – 2015-08-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
012 015
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/529

Abstract

Our project aims to assess the current participatory process that exists in Vietnam for draft legislation and regulations, testing whether participation by businesses can improve labor rights and safety. We use an RCT to analyze the downstream compliance to an important chemical storage regulation of five randomly assigned groups of firms: 1) those simply receiving a presentation about the regulation; 2) those invited to provide comments on the draft regulation; 3) those invited, but also subsequently notified of the response of the responsible regulatory agency to their comments; 4) those not invited, but told about the participation of similar firms; and 5) a control group not invited to participate, but instead receiving a placebo. After the final regulation is promulgated, the team will monitor the firms in all five groups to test compliance with the final legislation. Because safety requirements for hazardous chemicals are readily observable, we will have clear evidence of whether participation led to downstream compliance and which of the 3 mechanisms is most responsible.

Many developing countries, including Vietnam, suffer from a challenging combination of a rapidly expanding business sector (especially small and medium sized firms) and limited government capacity to carry out its mandate of regulating the impact of businesses on their surrounding environments, employees, and communities. The consequences of the gap between these two realities are substantial, in terms of both tangible harm to members of society and a reduced legitimacy for government.

International development organizations invest millions of dollars each year into legislative participation campaigns in an effort to foster improved governance. Political scientists in the Deliberative Democracy literature, in particular, argue that participation in the drafting of new rules, through public comment periods, provides information about citizens’ needs and preferences to government. Governments can then use this information, they argue, to make laws and regulations that will enjoy wider societal compliance. Relatedly, studies in psychology and organizational behavior indicate that individuals are more likely to follow rules they have had the opportunity to influence. We propose that a similar dynamic between participation and compliance applies among businesses as well.

Testing this hypothesis in a developing country context constitutes a critical contribution to research on how participation affects policy outcomes because of the uniquely powerful influence firms have over workers and the environment. Recent newspapers headlines have documented the substantial harm caused by firms not complying with government labor, safety, and environmental regulations. In preparation for our project, Vietnam’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLISA) calculated that less than 10% of firms are currently in compliance with rules on worker safety, with the frequency of violations particularly large among smaller, more informal operations. Because of the limited capacity of many developing countries, greater enforcement does not seem to be a viable option; encouraging self-compliance is truly the best hope.

There are important policy implications to be drawn from better understanding of the precise mechanisms by which firm participation in rule making influence subsequent compliance. Three underlying mechanisms have been proposed by Deliberative Democracy theorists: 1) firms have a better understanding of regulations and so are less likely to make mistakes; 2) firms view the legislative process and governing institutions as more legitimate after participation; 3) the resulting legislation is of higher quality and better tailored to local preferences, thereby reducing conflict between firms and the state. These ideas have had real influence in developing countries, including our setting of Vietnam, where extensive new participation measures—such as online commenting on draft laws—have been introduced in recent years.

Experimental design

Our project aims to assess the current participatory process that exists in Vietnam for draft legislation and regulations, testing whether participation by businesses can improve labor rights and safety. We use an RCT to analyze the downstream compliance to an important chemical storage regulation of five randomly assigned groups of firms: 1) those simply receiving a presentation about the regulation; 2) those invited to provide comments on the draft regulation; 3) those invited, but also subsequently notified of the response of the responsible regulatory agency to their comments; 4) those not invited, but told about the participation of similar firms; and 5) a control group not invited to participate, but instead receiving a placebo. After the final regulation is promulgated, the team will monitor the firms in all five groups to test compliance with the final legislation. Because safety requirements for hazardous chemicals are readily observable, we will have clear evidence of whether participation led to downstream compliance and which of the 3 mechanisms is most responsible.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer
Randomization unit
Individual businesses, which use or produce hazardous chemicals. Businesses are clustered with provinces (Hanoi and surrounding provinces, and individual districts within Hanoi).
Clusters
6 provinces (Hanoi, Bac Ninh, Hai Duong, Vinh Phuc, Phu Tho, Hung Yen), 43 districts
Observations
2000 businesses
Arms
Arm 1: Placebo: 600; Information Treatment 400; Participation Treatment 800 Arm 2: Control 300; Indirect Democracy 300; No Response from Government 400; Positive Response from Government 400
Primary outcomes
Compliance Measure 1: Calls to VCCI Regulatory Hotline. During the pre-treatment survey, all firms will be provided with a credit card-shaped thumb drive (USB – see images of product and planned content below) that has VCCI’s seal on the cover. The thumb drive cover will also advertise a toll-free hotline that businesses can call if they have questions about adjustments that need to be made to be considered in compliance with all new sanitary, environment, and labor safety regulations. The VCCI has agreed to host the hotline and MOLISA has agreed to provide chemical experts who can answer any detailed questions of businesses. As an initial measure of interest in compliance, we will record whether firms called the hotline for assistance, which will provide an initial intention to treat effect. Compliance Measure 2: Self-Reported Compliance. 45 days after the posting of the final regulation by MOLISA and acceptance by the Vietnamese National Assembly, our teams will return to visit all business to conduct a brief post-treatment survey (June 2015). During this 15-minute survey, firms will be asked about 3 specific requirements of the Draft Regulation on Handling and Storage of Hazardous Chemicals: 1) equipment, including gloves, masks, and safety showers; 2) storage, including proper containers and designated safety labels; 3) factory organization, including placement of storage facilities and ventilation. Firms will be asked to answer yes or no questions about whether their current processes in these 3 areas are in compliance with Final Regulation on Handling and Storage of Hazardous Chemicals. Compliance Measure 3: Observed Compliance. After the post-treatment survey at the firm’s factory location, firms will be asked to show the enumerator evidence of their compliance with the final regulation in the 3 highlighted areas (equipment, storage, and factory outlay). Assessments will only be taken of firms that volunteer to show enumerator their facilities and on particularly easy requirements. A key part of our search for the appropriate regulation has been that they include such easy to observe components and–while it is not possible to specifically identify these components until the draft regulation for public commentary is complete–MOLISA chemical experts have strongly recommended the three areas highlighted above are particularly feasible. Times will differ by factories, but we estimate observing compliance should take a maximum of twenty minutes. Only if firms agree, photographs of chemical equipment, storage, and outlay will be taken and stored with the dataset. Like the dataset, these photographs will be only identified with a firm id generated by the PIs that is only available to the PIs. The connection between firm identifying information and firm id is also only available to PIs. Further, we do not plan to publish these photographs in any publication or presentation relating to this research. Express consent would need to be sought for any such actions. Summary of Stage 3: A hotline number for complying with regulations will be provided to firms during the pre-treatment survey in September 2014 and will be live immediately. Self-reported compliance will be measured in a post-treatments survey administered to all 1800 firms that will take about 15 minutes. Direct observations of compliance will take place immediately after the post-treatment survey. Observations of compliance will be voluntary and will not take longer than 20 minutes. This is simply an assessment of enumerators and it will be made very clear that this is not a formal inspection. It is impossible to measure whether participation improved the quality of the law and therefore stimulated compliance through experimental design. The problem is that, unless firm-level preferences are highly variegated, it is unlikely that control and treatment groups will differ dramatically in their preferences over the regulation. Consequently, if the treatment groups’ ideas significantly improve the quality and acceptability of the laws, control firms are as likely to change their behavior as treatment firms. We would observe no difference between the compliance of the different groups statistically. In short, a highly successful experiment would appear as a non-result. Q1 (Quality of Regulation): To ensure that we capture this potential effect, we have designated a fifth group of 100 firms as “judges” of legal quality. These firms will also be randomly sampled from the population at the beginning of the experiment, and will match the other groups on all observable characteristics. Rather than being subject to an experimental manipulation, these firms will simply be given untitled and unmarked versions of the draft regulation and final regulation resulting from the controlled experiment during June 2014. Their primary task will be to identify which of these blind documents they think is the superior legislation. The selection should not take longer than 10 minutes. Q2 (Watered Down Regulation): To ensure that high quality law does not simply mean “watered down” regulations, we are also preparing to engage in an equivalent exercise with a group of 30 labor safety experts and knowledgeable workers. This group will also be asked to assess whether the final regulation is better than the draft in terms of its protections for workers. The selection should not take longer than 10 minutes.

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