Participation in Regulatory Drafting and Downstream Compliance
How to cite
Malesky, Edmund; Taussig, Markus. 2014. "Participation in Regulatory Drafting and Downstream Compliance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000529. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.529-4.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Our project aims to assess the current participatory process that exists in Vietnam for draft legislation and regulations, testing whether participation by businesses can improve labor rights and safety. We use an RCT to analyze the downstream compliance to an important chemical storage regulation of five randomly assigned groups of firms: 1) those simply receiving a presentation about the regulation; 2) those invited to provide comments on the draft regulation; 3) those invited, but also subsequently notified of the response of the responsible regulatory agency to their comments; 4) those not invited, but told about the participation of similar firms; and 5) a control group not invited to participate, but instead receiving a placebo. After the final regulation is promulgated, the team will monitor the firms in all five groups to test compliance with the final legislation. Because safety requirements for hazardous chemicals are readily observable, we will have clear evidence of whether participation led to downstream compliance and which of the 3 mechanisms is most responsible.
Many developing countries, including Vietnam, suffer from a challenging combination of a rapidly expanding business sector (especially small and medium sized firms) and limited government capacity to carry out its mandate of regulating the impact of businesses on their surrounding environments, employees, and communities. The consequences of the gap between these two realities are substantial, in terms of both tangible harm to members of society and a reduced legitimacy for government.
International development organizations invest millions of dollars each year into legislative participation campaigns in an effort to foster improved governance. Political scientists in the Deliberative Democracy literature, in particular, argue that participation in the drafting of new rules, through public comment periods, provides information about citizens’ needs and preferences to government. Governments can then use this information, they argue, to make laws and regulations that will enjoy wider societal compliance. Relatedly, studies in psychology and organizational behavior indicate that individuals are more likely to follow rules they have had the opportunity to influence. We propose that a similar dynamic between participation and compliance applies among businesses as well.
Testing this hypothesis in a developing country context constitutes a critical contribution to research on how participation affects policy outcomes because of the uniquely powerful influence firms have over workers and the environment. Recent newspapers headlines have documented the substantial harm caused by firms not complying with government labor, safety, and environmental regulations. In preparation for our project, Vietnam’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLISA) calculated that less than 10% of firms are currently in compliance with rules on worker safety, with the frequency of violations particularly large among smaller, more informal operations. Because of the limited capacity of many developing countries, greater enforcement does not seem to be a viable option; encouraging self-compliance is truly the best hope.
There are important policy implications to be drawn from better understanding of the precise mechanisms by which firm participation in rule making influence subsequent compliance. Three underlying mechanisms have been proposed by Deliberative Democracy theorists: 1) firms have a better understanding of regulations and so are less likely to make mistakes; 2) firms view the legislative process and governing institutions as more legitimate after participation; 3) the resulting legislation is of higher quality and better tailored to local preferences, thereby reducing conflict between firms and the state. These ideas have had real influence in developing countries, including our setting of Vietnam, where extensive new participation measures—such as online commenting on draft laws—have been introduced in recent years.
Experimental design
Our project aims to assess the current participatory process that exists in Vietnam for draft legislation and regulations, testing whether participation by businesses can improve labor rights and safety. We use an RCT to analyze the downstream compliance to an important chemical storage regulation of five randomly assigned groups of firms: 1) those simply receiving a presentation about the regulation; 2) those invited to provide comments on the draft regulation; 3) those invited, but also subsequently notified of the response of the responsible regulatory agency to their comments; 4) those not invited, but told about the participation of similar firms; and 5) a control group not invited to participate, but instead receiving a placebo. After the final regulation is promulgated, the team will monitor the firms in all five groups to test compliance with the final legislation. Because safety requirements for hazardous chemicals are readily observable, we will have clear evidence of whether participation led to downstream compliance and which of the 3 mechanisms is most responsible.
Design details
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