Targeting in Tax Compliance Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Honduras
How to cite
Scot, Thiago; Carmen, Giselle Del; Hernandez, Edgardo Enrique Espinal. 2020. "Targeting in Tax Compliance Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Honduras." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005285. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5285-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The use of letters informing taxpayers about audit probabilities or filing deadlines is popular among tax authorities (TA) and has been shown to positively impact tax compliance. When improvements in information collection are not accompanied by audit capacity, nonetheless, TAs face a credibility issue: informing taxpayers about knowledge of their wrongdoing and not following up by punishing non-compliers erode the credibility of the TA. Jointly with Honduras' Revenue Administration Service (SAR) we will randomize around 30,000 taxpayers into receiving detailed information about the tax authorities' knowledge on their operations before the filing deadline. Using rich administrative data on taxpayers' previous characteristics and behavior, we then aim to estimate heterogeneous treatment and use those to inform future targeting.
Intervention
This experiment will send email communications to approximately 30,000 at-risk taxpayers in Honduras before the income tax filing deadline for FY2019.
The control group (49% of the sample) will receive a simple reminder about the deadline to file their taxes and the importance to file truthful information.
The treatment group (51% of the sample) will receive an e-mail containing the same information as the control group and, in addition, will be told about specific information the tax authority possess about their transactions during FY2019. The emails are personalized for each taxpayer and include either the sources of third-party information the authority possess on their revenue (sales to other taxpayers, debit/credit card sales, exports or sales to the government) or indicators about their operations flagged by the authority (repeated reported losses, financial transactions inconsistent with reported revenue or too low revenues compared to peers) for taxpayers with no third-party information available.
Among the treated sample, taxpayers were further randomized into receiving three slightly different messages in addition to the information available to the TA. One-third of the treatment group (17% of total study sample) will see a message reminding them that reporting incorrect information makes them liable for fines and sanctions according to the law. One-third will see a message reminding them about other administrative sanctions for incorrect filings, such as the denial of documents necessary for firms' operations. Finally a last group will receive a call to "moral duty", reminding them that taxes are used to finance public goods such as health and education.
Experimental design
The experimental sample consists of at-risk taxpayers, as identified by the risk-model used by the TA, with at least one valid email address. We implement a stratified randomization using 60 strata defined by whether third-party information was available or not; whether the taxpayer was a corporation; municipality of operations defined as Distrito Central (capital Tegucigalpa), San Pedro Sula (second largest city) or other; and five risk levels as defined by the tax authority (2*2*3*5 = 60 strata).
In each strata we allocated 49% of taxpayers to the control group and the remaining 51% in three equally sized treatment arms (fines, administrative sanctions and moral duty). Following Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) we deal with "misfits" (remaining taxpayers in each strata) by randomly assigning them to one of the four groups (control + 3 treatments) using the above weights as assignment probabilities.
Design details
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