Fostering innovation: Experimental evidence on the effectiveness of behavioral interventions

How to cite

Zihlmann, Christian; Matthewes, Elisa; Nassar, Anis. 2019. "Fostering innovation: Experimental evidence on the effectiveness of behavioral interventions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005214. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5214-3.0

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Christian Zihlmann* , Elisa Matthewes , Anis Nassar

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005214
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5214-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-01-24 – 2022-10-19
Countries
Switzerland (Fribourg), France (Strasbourg)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5214

Abstract

Innovation is a core component of a growing economy. Yet, it is still to be fully understood
how to best foster it. We study in the laboratory the effect of making strategies or profits
salient on the choice of participants to innovate using a management game. To do so, we use
participants’ generated reports and vary their content to be either strategy or profit focused,
keeping everything else, including a pay-for-performance incentives scheme, fixed. We expect
that participants who are asked to report their strategies will be more innovative than those
who report their profits.

Intervention

The laboratory task is adapted from Ederer&Manso (2013). We employ the pay-for-performance scheme and keep that fixed. Our treatments target an individual's perceived salient aspect of the game: We ask subjects to report a specific aspect of the game and we expect them, through this shift of attention, to focus on the very aspect we ask them to report. Concretely, the treatments are as follows:
1. Control
No reporting. Mimics 1-to-1 the pay-for-performance treatment (Ederer&Manso (2013)).
2. Profit treatment
After the decisions are made, in period 3,6,9 and 12, subjects are requested to report
their profit of the last three periods. Along with the wording
"Please report the profit
of the last three periods", subjects will face an entry mask, where they need to enter
the profits of the last three period.
3. Strategy treatment
After the decisions are made, in period 3,6,9 and 12, subjects are requested to report
their strategy of the last three periods.

For further details, refer to the pre-analysis plan.

Experimental design

Our experimental task is adapted from Ederer & Manso (2013). Subjects solve a task in which
they are facing a trade-off between exploration and exploitation: Participants manage a virtual
lemonade stand. Over 20 experimental periods, participants decide on multiple parameters
such as the recipe of the lemonade (sugar and lemonade content as well as color), the location
of the lemonade stand and the price of a cup of lemonade. The possible combinations of these
choice variables amounts to 23’522’994 combinations
. Participants are compensated accord-
ing to the realized profits. Thus, participants aim is to maximize the profit of the lemonade
stand, and with it, their own earnings. Participants do not know the profits associated with
each of the available choices. Participants receive a default strategy, i.e. the choices and the
associated profit of a fictitious previous manager. The default strategy is not the
most profitable strategy.
After each period, participants learn the profit for the implemented choices. Also, they
receive a brief customer feedback, implemented by having the computer randomly select one
of the three continuous choice variables (price, lemon or sugar content) to provide a binary
feedback. Consequently, the feedback is only informative for the location in which the subject
chose to sell in the current period.
The task is characterized by an exploration-exploitation trade-off with two main behaviors:
either fine-tuning the default strategy and yielding a profit similar to the previous manager
(exploitation), or experimenting with new strategies and taking the associated risk of failure
but also the chance of success (exploration). Parameters are designed in way that exploration
will increase chances to identify the strategy that leads to the global maximum while exploita-
tion rather leads to local maxima. The parameters to calculate the profits of the lemonade
stand are one-to-one adapted from Ederer & Manso (2013).
The payoff is determined by a standard pay-for-performance incentive scheme: participants
are paid 50% of the profits they make during all the 20 periods.
Then, we implement the treatments as describe in the intervention section.
After the lemonade stand task, we elicit the following individual characteristics
through a survey: demographics, risk preferences (Falk et al. 2018) and Big-5 (Lang et al.
2011).

Design details

Randomization method
Random cubicle/computer assignment in the laboratory through a random draw.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
No clusters, all sessions conducted in the laboratory (Strasbourg).
Observations
We will follow a sequential analyses approach as proposed by Lakens (2014). For further details and full specification of the sequential analyses procedure, please refer to the pre-analysis plan. Expected sample size: between 90 to 180 subjects.
Arms
We will follow a sequential analyses approach as proposed by Lakens (2014). For further details and full specification of the sequential analyses procedure, please refer to the pre-analysis plan. Expected sample size for each treatment arm: between 30 to 60 subjects, maximally 100 subjects per treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
Exploration behavior, proxied by different variables (see Ederer & Manso 2013): - maximal per-period profit - profit in the final period - location in the final period - longest duration of an exploration phase - standard deviation from three continuous variables
Secondary outcomes
Attention (or Effort)

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Matthewes E, Nassar A, Zihlmann C (2022) Fostering innovation: Experimental evidence on the effectiveness of behavioral interventions. PLoS ONE 17(10): e0276463. https://doi.org/ 10.1371/journal.pone.0276463 https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0276463

Cited by

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Keywords