This study compares the relative effectiveness of standard microcredit and digital credit in minimizing borrower default and producing efficient lending outcomes. In partnership with a financial technology company based in Pakistan, I implement a randomized trial that randomizes the agent - i.e., loan officer or machine learning algorithm - as well as the information available to that agent in making a credit decision. The results from this intervention will shed light on machine learning techniques' potential, if any, to reduce borrower default relative to a human only model of credit approval in informal credit markets.
Intervention
This research project compares the effectiveness of standard microcredit and digital credit in producing efficient lending outcomes. In partnership with E, a leading financial technology company based in Pakistan, I will implement a randomized controlled trial (RCT) that randomizes the agent (i.e., loan officer or machine learning algorithm) as well as the information available to that agent in making a credit decision. The results from the intervention will shed light on machine learning techniques' potential, if any, to reduce borrower default relative to a human only model of credit approval in informal credit markets.
This research project contributes to the existing literature in several meaningful ways. First, most of the research on digital credit's (or, in general, algorithms') effectiveness has centered on developed economies, where credit markets are far more complete than in Pakistan. Second, while there has been research comparing the efficiency of algorithms to humans, relatively little is known about why outcomes differ between the two. Algorithms usually have access to information that humans may not observe, and vice versa. Additionally, conditional on being exposed to the exact same information, algorithms might put a different weight on certain observable characteristics when making a lending determination.
My project's experimental design will disentangle the relative importance of these differences explicitly. Additionally, this study will directly consider the ways in which algorithms and human decision making differ for marginalized groups in Pakistan such as women and ethnic minorities. In doing so, I hope to determine the extent to which the digital credit revolution may improve financial access for the most vulnerable groups within a country.
Experimental design
Loan applications received by E will be randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups.
In the first and second groups, the exact same applicant information will be provided to a human or fed into the algorithm, respectively. In the third and fourth treatment groups, I will feed additional information usually only observed by humans and algorithms, respectively.
Design details
Randomization method
The randomization was done by the lead researcher on a computer, using a random number generator.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is individual loan applications.
Clusters
5,172 loans
Observations
5,172 observations
Arms
There are 1,293 applications in each treatment arm.
The sampling design over-samples applicants from traditionally disadvantaged groups in Pakistan to determine whether algorithms and loan officers' lending decisions differ substantially across majority and minority groups. Specifically, I over-sample: 1) women, and 2) men from the Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provinces, hereafter referred to as BK men. These two groups are traditionally marginalized in Pakistan and tend to have worse various socioeconomic outcomes relative to the rest of the country. The remaining under-sampled group is the "majority" group in Pakistan, consisting of men from Sindh and Punjab provinces, hereafter referred to as SP men.
The sample is evenly split across the three groups in order to increase the precision of any heterogeneity analyses, with 1,724 members from each group in the final sample. Randomization is stratified by these groups to ensure identical gender and ethnic composition across the treatments. By design therefore, there are 431 women, BK men, and SP men in each treatment group.
Primary outcomes
I will consider three main variables. The outcomes variables and their various definitions are stated below:
1. Borrower selection: An indicator variable that equals one if the loan application is approved, zero otherwise.
2. Borrower default probability: Default is defined as an indicator variable that equals one if any part of the loan amount (including interest and relevant late fees) is overdue:
(i) For more than 8 days after the due date.
(ii) For more than 30 days after the due date.
(iii) For more than 60 days after the due date.
(iv) For more than 365 days after the due date.
3. Loan margin: Total accounting and economic margin on the loan. For illustrative purposes, consider a PKR 1,000 loan with PKR 50 in charged interest. The margins are calculated as follows:
(i) Accounting margin: Total margin earned or lost on the loan. If a borrower repays the loan by the due date, then accounting margin equals PKR 50. If the borrower completely defaults on the loan (where default is defined as having the full amount overdue for more than 365 days after the due date), then accounting margin is PKR -1,000.
(ii) Economic margin: Total margin earned or lost on the loan, taking into account forgone interest. If a borrower repays the loan and interest by the due date, then economic margin equals accounting margin at PKR 50. However, in case of complete default, the economic margin is the accounting margin plus forgone interest on the defaulted principal. Forgone interest is calculated as the product of: Defaulted principal x average APR on similar principal amounts earned by E x average repayment probability.
Sponsors
Name: The Weiss Fund for Research in Development Economics
Location: Boston, MA, USA
Url: https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/wfrde/home
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.