Threshold public good games under uncertainty with different summation technologies
How to cite
Carlsson, Fredrik; Lange, Andreas; Ek, Claes. 2019. "Threshold public good games under uncertainty with different summation technologies." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005175. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5175-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment we investigate the role of threshold uncertainty in a threshold public good game. We build on the work by Barrett and Dannenberg (PNAS, 2012). We first attempt to replicate their finding that the introduction of threshold uncertainty reduces contributions and increases the probability of not reaching the threshold in a public good game with a standard summation technology. We then introduce another version of the game with the difference that the technology is weakest link instead of a standard summation. We investigate how uncertainty affects contributions and the probability of not reaching the threshold in a weakest link setting. We then also compare summation with weakest link technology.
Intervention
The main question is what role the summation technology plays in threshold public good games. In particular, we investigate if there are differences between a standard summation technology and a weakest link technology on contribution to the public good and on the probability of not reaching the threshold.
Experimental design
We investigate if there are differences between a standard summation technology and a weakest link technology on contribution to the public good and on the probability of not reaching the threshold.
Design details
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