Demand for and impacts of mobile phone-based index insurance in agriculture: Experimental evidence from Kenya.
How to cite
Jack, William; Cilliers, Jacobus; Zeitlin, Andrew. 2020. "Demand for and impacts of mobile phone-based index insurance in agriculture: Experimental evidence from Kenya.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005170. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5170-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We evaluate the impact an index-based insurance product aimed at protecting smallholder farmers against weather hazards in rural Kenya. The product aims to alleviate credit constraints by allows farmers to buy insurance with ‘bite-sized’ premium payments over a period of time. In order to test for this mechanism, we experimentally vary the time when farmers are allowed to buy the insurance: in 90 randomly selected villages farmers can buy the product up four to months prior to the planting season, in another 90 villages the farmers can only buy the product a few weeks before the planting season. Moreover, we also test for the elasticity of demand by providing subsidized insurance in 90 villages. Another 90 villages are assigned to the control. We track the same group of 2,160 farmers over a period of a year, and sell them insurance for two different agricultural seasons. Household-level data is collected at three different points in time: once prior to the start of the program, once after the completion of the first season, and again at the end of the second season. We estimate the impact of insurance on investment in agriculture, the distribution of profits, asset ownership, and subsequent demand.
Intervention
Bima Pima (BP) is an index-based insurance product aimed at protecting smallholder farmers against weather hazards. Pay-outs are based on rainfall during the planting season. The insurance can be bought in the form of scratch cards that cost 50 KSh each. Farmers will also have the option to buy the insurance directly through a mobile platform. Those who have already purchased a scratch card may buy additional insurance through this mobile platform to “top up” their insurance for any desired amount. The location of the insurance cover is tied to the initial BP purchase, which is calculated by cell tower triangulation. This information is collected when the scratch card’s code is registered via SMS, that is if the initial bit of insurance is obtained through a scratch card. For those purchasing their initial bit of coverage from a mobile phone, location data is collected at the time of mobile registration.
The trial consists of four evaluation arms:
1. Pure control
2. Late access, no subsidy: farmers are sold the product a few weeks before the beginning of the planting season.
3. Early access, no subsidy: farmers are sold the product 4 months before beginning of planting season. This grants farmers more time to purchase “top ups”.
4. Early access with subsidy: farmers receive 50% subsidy.
At baseline all treatment groups were visited twice, early (i.e., four months prior to the beginning of the planting season) and late (i.e., a few weeks prior to the beginning of the planting season), during which we promote the product. However, at the time of the first visit, the late-access farmers are told the product will not be available to them until closer to the planting season. For the second season, we sold the insurance at the same time in all the treatment arms. There was therefore no difference between the Early and Late treatment arms.
Experimental design
The trial consists of four evaluation arms:
0. Pure control (90 villages)
1. Late access, no subsidy: farmers are sold the product a few weeks before the beginning of the planting season (90 villages).
2. Early access, no subsidy: farmers are sold the product 4 months before beginning of planting season. This grants farmers more time to purchase “top ups” (90 villages).
3. Early access with subsidy: farmers receive 50% subsidy (90 villages).
During the second agricultural there was no distinction between early and late access. The farmers in the first and second treatment arms were therefore exposed to the same treatment in the second season.
Design details
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