The effect of the outside option on reciprocal behavior

How to cite

Yang, Jierui. 2022. "The effect of the outside option on reciprocal behavior." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005129. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5129-1.0

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Jierui Yang*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005129
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5129-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2021-12-05 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D91, D64
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5129

Abstract

Many economic and social interactions involve trust and reciprocation (e.g. employer-employee, buyer-seller, borrower-lender). It is well-known that at least some people are trustworthy: they are willing to reciprocate if their partner trusts them, even when reciprocation comes at a substantial monetary cost. Not much is known, however, about the effect of the cost of trusting for the partner's reciprocation: are people more inclined to reciprocate trust, the higher the amount that the partner leaves on the table by trusting, that is, the ‘better’ is the outside option? We study this question by designing laboratory experiments in which participants play trust games that vary in terms of the outside option. The answer to this question helps to understand trust relations.

Intervention

• Low, Medium or High outside options (within subjects).
• Trustor’s decision choice is made by a real person or a computer (between subjects).
• Trustee’s decision choice is unconditional or conditional on trustor’s beliefs (between subjects).

Experimental design

Participants will play 15 binary trust games that differ in the payoff the trustor gets when not trusting (referred to as the outside option, either Low, Medium or High) and the efficiency gain of the trustee's reciprocal choice.

Design details

Randomization method
Participants will randomly draw a number card to decide which computer in the lab they will use. The game sequence randomization and stranger matching is done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
320 individuals
Observations
320 individuals
Arms
80 individuals for each treatment
Primary outcomes
- allocation decisions by the trustees - beliefs by the trustors

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords