A Design-Based Approach Towards Understanding Gender Differences in Tournament Entry

How to cite

Bartos, Vojtech; Veldhuizen, Roel van. 2019. "A Design-Based Approach Towards Understanding Gender Differences in Tournament Entry." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005112. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5112-1.1

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Vojtech Bartos* , Roel van Veldhuizen

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005112
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5112-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-11-29 – 2020-12-11
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
J16, D01, C90
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5112

Abstract

We propose a non-parametric method that allows us to identify the factors that drive observed effects using treatment comparisons. We implement this method in a laboratory experiment where participants choose between piece rate and tournament pay and use it to estimate the importance of a number of key drivers of the often-observed gender gap in tournament entry, including the role of selection into tournament and the role of externalities on others’ payoffs typically not considered in the literature. We also compare the results of our method to previous estimates that rely on parametric regression-based method to identify the drivers of the gender gap in willingness to compete. Finally, we intend to use our estimates to design environments in which tournament entry is brought in line with different policy goals.

Experimental design

The experiment consists of three rounds. In each round, participants work on a real-effort task that consists of adding 5 two-digit numbers for 3 minutes. In round 1, participants are paid a piece-rate that gives them 10 ECU per correct answer. In round 2, participants are paid a tournament rate of 20 ECU per correct answer if they beat the score of another participant. In round 3, participants make eight choices between various incentive schemes; one of these choices is randomly selected before participants work on the task. At the end of the experiment, one of the three rounds is randomly chosen for payment.

Design details

Randomization method
computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
400 individuals
Observations
400 individuals, treatments within-subject
Arms
400 individuals, treatments within-subject
Primary outcomes
Payment method choice (either binary or a price-list)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords