Stag Hunt at the Prison: Risk Dominance and Cooperation in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

How to cite

Jagau, Stephan. 2019. "Stag Hunt at the Prison: Risk Dominance and Cooperation in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005109. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5109-1.0

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Stephan Jagau*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005109
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5109-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-11-25 – 2020-02-29
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C72, C73, C91, D83, D90
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5109

Abstract

Experiments on the repeated prisoner's dilemma (RPD) have recently gained traction making predictions among an "embarrassing" richness of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. The most popular experimentally motivated refinement is Blonski and Spagnolo's (2015) riskiness. The idea is to relate the prisoner's other dilemma of selecting among different cooperative and non-cooperative strategies to the equilibrium selection problem in static coordination games. Using systematic variations in RPD payoffs and a novel measure of attitudes towards the risk/efficiency trade-off in coordination games, the present study is the first direct test of the theory.

Experimental design

The experiment consists of four parts that are administered in fixed order. Parts 1, 3, and 4 are identical for each subject. The order in which items appear is randomized at the subject level for Parts 1, 3, and 4, and it is fixed for Part 2. Part 2 implements RPD's and includes a between-subject treatment with 4 different levels of the sucker's payoff. Also RPD lengths are matched across treatment groups at the session level, using four independent draws of RPD lengths for a total of 16 sessions. This can be seen as a second between-subject treatment.
Detailed Protocol:
(1) 18 one-shot CGs against a fixed partner with no feedback. CG-payoffs are varied according to a choice-list paradigm across two families of CGs.
(2) 17 matches of standard direct-response implementation of a fixed RPD. The payoff matrix is varied between-subject following four treatments. RPD lengths are fixed at session level and matched across treatments. A total of four different length schedules will be run in this fashion.
(3) Auxiliary measures of risk- and ambiguity attitudes using a choice-list paradigm. 4 choice lists with a total of 60 decisions are administered.
(4) An auxiliary measure of social value orientation using the standard slider measure. 6 slider items are administered.
Post Session: Demographic survey
Payment: Randomized incentive scheme, one decision per part is paid. All payment-related feedback is withheld until the end of session.

Design details

Randomization method
Probabilities for ambiguous gambles are randomly drawn by a UCI administrative official with no information regarding the experimental protocol. All other randomization is computerized using native Python procedures or procedures from the Python library NumPy. All game lengths for Part 2 were randomly drawn on 11/23/2019 using a numpy implementation of a negative Bernoulli process. Lengths and treatments were randomly assigned to session dates, subject to the balancing constraints mentioned in the design description. All other computerized randomization is carried out in real time during sessions.
Randomization unit
Game lengths and treatments for Part 2 are clustered at the session level and lengths schedules are balanced across treatments.
Clusters
16 experimental sessions
Observations
384 subjects
Arms
24 subjects per session
Primary outcomes
Risk-dominance switching points in Part 1; Initial propensity of cooperation in Part 2

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Keywords