Risk-sharing to mitigate local environmental risks

How to cite

Barnwal, Prabhat; Geen, Alexander Van; Wang, Yiqian. 2021. "Risk-sharing to mitigate local environmental risks." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005071. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5071-1.3

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Prabhat Barnwal* , Alexander Van Geen , Yiqian Wang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005071
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5071-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2020-01-01 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
Secondary IDs
NSF Proposal # 1851928, 1853289
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5071

Abstract

This project studies the role of risk-sharing and social networks in the mitigation of local environmental risks. We focus on two aspects: first, risk mitigation through informal insurance contracts between households; and, second, the importance of social monitoring for enforcing informal insurance contracts. Our objective is to understand whether commitment contracts between pairs of households meant to insure the consumption of either household can help mitigate local environmental risk. To test this, we have chosen as context a major disaster of natural origin: toxic levels of arsenic in groundwater pumped by millions of private wells in Bangladesh. We further hypothesize that compliance in informal agreements to cooperate needs monitoring by local peers for enforcement. To test our research questions, we implement a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in 135 villages in rural Bangladesh. We evaluate two interventions: mutual commitment contract and peer-monitoring of the contract.

Intervention

We carry out two interventions.
1. Mutual Commitment Contract: This treatment is designed to reduce the commitment frictions frequently encountered in risk-sharing. The mutual commitment contract, designed as a 'water sharing coupon', is pre-printed with a statement of commitment to share water in the future. Each tubewell owner is provided a set of coupons to exchange with other well owners. Households are then asked to get into a mutual commitment contract by exchanging coupons with other households. These contracts are formed before wells are tested for arsenic.

By exchanging coupons, symmetric risk-sharing relationships are established between two households.
Ideally, households should be allowed to exchange as many coupons as they like. We restrict the number of coupons to 10 for each well for operational tractability in most cases, based on our pilot work. Well-owners receive ten coupons per well for them to share with other well-owners.

We gave households 3 days to exchange coupons with other well-owner households in their villages. On the first day of the visit, the field agents invited qualified households to exchange coupons with other qualified household. Three days after the coupon distribution, field agents return to the village and record the tubewell and household IDs from the coupons each well-owning household held. Households keep the coupons.

2. Peer Monitoring: The second treatment aims to increase the expectation of peer monitoring of commitment contracts in the village. We sent text messages about contract exchanges to the participated villagers.
We characterize the Nth-order-neighbor as the neighbor that is N steps away from a given household in the contract-exchange network. For example, the first-order neighbors are the well-owners that directly exchanged contracts with the household, and the second-order neighbors are the well-owners that directly exchanged contracts with the household’s first-order neighbors, but did not directly exchange with the household, and so on. We randomly drew one first-order neighbor and one second-order neighbor to send the text messages if the household exchanged contracts with more than one first-order neighbor and had more than one second-order neighbor. If the household only has one first-order neighbor and zero second-order neighbors, the message will be sent to the only first-order neighbor.

The text messages are sent to the participated households in treated villages after the tubewell testing. A local phone carrier sent the text messages to the selected neighbors, telling them whom the household exchanged contracts with. The text message will include two risk-sharers’ names and the total number of exchanges the household made. The treatment also informs each household whose information is shared.

We obtained consent from households regarding this peer monitoring in advance (before the commitment contracts are formed). However, to reduce any bias arising from this consent, the actual peer monitoring is implemented in only half the villages where such consent was obtained.

Experimental design

Our research features a clustered-randomization design. We randomly assigned 135 villages to 4 treatment arms.

Control (C): 36 villages are randomly selected into the control group. In the control group, we did not implement any interventions. We will record the simultaneous well switching and sharing to measure the magnitude of business-as-usual risk-sharing in these villages.

Commitment Contract (T1): 33 villages are randomly selected into the mutual commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange them with other households to form commitment.

Commitment Contract + Peer Monitoring Notification only (T2): 33 villages are randomly selected into the commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange. Additionally, we notify households about the possibility that there will be a peer monitoring program implemented after the well testing and obtain their consent.. We do not implement the peer monitoring program eventually.

Commitment Contract + Peer Monitoring Notification only + Peer Monitoring (T3): 33 villages are randomly selected for the commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange. Additionally, we notify households about the possibility that there will be a peer monitoring program implemented after the well testing and obtain their consent. We implement the peer monitoring program eventually.

We collect endline data in two rounds of surveys -- the first endline survey immediately after well testing, and the second endline survey about 1.5 years later.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Village based cluster randomization.
Clusters
135 villages. In case of large villages, a predefined part of the village (called para) is considered as one village unit.
Observations
16,054 households from the villages surveyed at the baseline. Among these households, 11,975 households are targeted as the experiment subjects as they fully or partly owned at least one well.
Arms
36 control villages; 33 villages in T1, 33 villages in T2 and 33 villages in T3 group.
Primary outcomes
1. The number of water-sharing agreements made by households (i.e., number of coupons exchanged), 2. Whether the household discussed water sharing with other households, 3. Access to low-arsenic water at the household level (continuous and binary), 4. Whether households with unsafe wells switch to a low-arsenic well ("switching"), 5. Changes in norms and preferences about sharing low-arsenic water from private wells.
Secondary outcomes
Whether two households make water-sharing agreement (dyad level)
Partners
Name: Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), Bangladesh Partner_type: ngo Url: https://www.poverty-action.org/country/bangladesh

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Keywords