Descriptive vs injunctive norms

How to cite

Breuer, Kevin; Feldhaus, Christoph. 2019. "Descriptive vs injunctive norms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005070. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5070-1.1

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Kevin Breuer* , Christoph Feldhaus

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005070
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5070-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2019-11-21 – 2019-12-06
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5070

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we test the effect of (different types of) norms (injunctive or descriptive) on behavior of decision makers and potential punishers in a take-frame-laboratory-dictator-game experiment. First, the dictators (or workers) take part in a real-effort task that generates 6 € for a charitable organization. Afterwards, the dictators can choose how much of the 6 € they want to take for themselves as wage. Then, the punishers can choose to costly punish the behavior of the dictators.

We manipulate the corresponding (injunctive or descriptive) norm regarding appropriate/usual behavior of dictators by making use of the scale manipulation technique that provides subtle information regarding the perceived actual norm and is particularly effective in presence of uncertainty.

To manipulate norm beliefs, we make decision makers and punishers submit their belief regarding the (injunctive and descriptive) norm regarding behavior. Importantly, they do so either on a scale that implies a pro-social norm (taking little) and/or an egoism norm (taking much).

Experimental design

In a laboratory experiment, we test the effect of (different types of) norms (injunctive or descriptive) on behavior of decision makers and potential punishers in a take-frame-laboratory-dictator-game experiment. First, the dictators (or workers) take part in a real-effort task that generates 6 € for a charitable organization. Afterwards, the dictators can choose how much of the 6 € they want to take for themselves as wage. Then, the punishers can choose to costly punish the behavior of the dictators.

We manipulate the corresponding (injunctive or descriptive) norm regarding appropriate/usual behavior of dictators by making use of the scale manipulation technique that provides subtle information regarding the perceived actual norm and is particularly effective in presence of uncertainty.

To manipulate norm beliefs, we make decision makers and punishers submit their belief regarding the (injunctive and descriptive) norm regarding behavior. Importantly, they do so either on a scale that implies a pro-social norm (taking little) and/or an egoism norm (taking much).

Design details

Randomization method
Lottery
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
No clusters.
Observations
We sample 80 observations per treatment and role (dictator/punisher) in a laboratory experiment. Note: We kick-off data collection with a pilot on the 21st of November 2019. We might stop the data collection if the parametrization of the design turns out to be inadequate.
Arms
The sample is equally allocated.
Primary outcomes
Money taken away as wage from the charity (dictator/worker). Punishment points invested using strategy method (punisher).

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Keywords