Addressing Economic Constraints of Technology Adoption for Postharvest Practices and Rice Seed Storage in Bangladesh
How to cite
Yu, Jisang; Schwab, Benjamin. 2019. "Addressing Economic Constraints of Technology Adoption for Postharvest Practices and Rice Seed Storage in Bangladesh." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005035. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5035-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Successful adoption of relatively new post-harvest technologies in developing countries is often linked to the provision of mechanisms that allow potential users to overcome economic constraints. Effective research into designing adoption mechanisms incorporates two key dimensions: understanding the technical and perceived value of technologies by users, and carefully evaluating their implementation. We focus on the mechanism design for the adoption of hermetic bags (i.e. GrainPro bag) for rice seed storage. Proper seed storage may boost crop yields by increasing the germination rates and hermetic storage leads to higher quality seeds. While many economic studies examine the factors that deter technology adoptions in various contexts, we plan to focus on two constraints, liquidity and risk. Our goal is to evaluate which constraints serve as key barriers for smallholders in Bangladesh. Providing evidence on the relative importance of these pathways permits the design of more effective tools to target mechanisms that facilitate the adoption of valued technologies.
Intervention
We will conduct an adoption experiment featuring a hermetic storage bag (GrainPro bag) for rice seed storage. We plan to do a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction to elicit the willingness-to-pay for a hermetic bag during the baseline survey along with the following interventions: T1) a warranty, T2) delayed payment (loan) for the storage bag, and C) control. The treatment will be randomly assigned. We plan to do village-level cluster randomization.
Experimental design
We combine the BDM auction with a random assignment of contracts.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.