The effect of loss framing on the productivity of high and low performing agents
How to cite
Essl, Andrea; Jaussi, Stefanie; Friedrich, Kathrin; Bieberstein, Frauke von; Thommes, Kirsten; Hoffmann, Christin. 2019. "The effect of loss framing on the productivity of high and low performing agents." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005003. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5003-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we examine how introducing a gain and loss contract affects the productivity of high and low performing agents. In the experiment, participants first perform a real-effort task under a fixed wage. The stage is used to measure participants’ baseline performance. In a second stage, participants work on the same real-effort task, but the payment scheme varies across treatments. They now either work under a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. The incentive contracts are payoff equivalent and only differ in terms of framing.
Intervention
First, participants work on a real-effort task under a fixed wage contract. In this stage, we assess participants’ baseline performance and accordingly, we classify participants in high and low performing agents. Second, participants work on the same task under either a positively framed gain contract (gain treatment) or a negatively framed loss contract (loss treatment). This stage is used to analyze how the introduction of incentive contracts affects the productivity of high and low performing agents.
Experimental design
Lab experiment. Between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the session level to either the gain or the loss treatment. Two stages: First, participants work on a real-effort task under a fixed wage contract. In this stage, we assess participants’ baseline performance and accordingly, we classify participants in high and low performing agents. Second, participants work on the same task under either a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. This stage is used to analyze how the introduction of incentive contracts affects the productivity of high and low performing agents. In addition, we elicit individual loss aversion. Participants fill out a non-incentivized questionnaire.
Design details
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