The effect of loss framing on the productivity of high and low performing agents

How to cite

Essl, Andrea; Jaussi, Stefanie; Friedrich, Kathrin; Bieberstein, Frauke von; Thommes, Kirsten; Hoffmann, Christin. 2019. "The effect of loss framing on the productivity of high and low performing agents." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0005003. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5003-1.0

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Andrea Essl* , Stefanie Jaussi , Kathrin Friedrich , Frauke von Bieberstein , Kirsten Thommes , Christin Hoffmann

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0005003
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5003-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-06-01 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5003

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we examine how introducing a gain and loss contract affects the productivity of high and low performing agents. In the experiment, participants first perform a real-effort task under a fixed wage. The stage is used to measure participants’ baseline performance. In a second stage, participants work on the same real-effort task, but the payment scheme varies across treatments. They now either work under a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. The incentive contracts are payoff equivalent and only differ in terms of framing.

Intervention

First, participants work on a real-effort task under a fixed wage contract. In this stage, we assess participants’ baseline performance and accordingly, we classify participants in high and low performing agents. Second, participants work on the same task under either a positively framed gain contract (gain treatment) or a negatively framed loss contract (loss treatment). This stage is used to analyze how the introduction of incentive contracts affects the productivity of high and low performing agents.

Experimental design

Lab experiment. Between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the session level to either the gain or the loss treatment. Two stages: First, participants work on a real-effort task under a fixed wage contract. In this stage, we assess participants’ baseline performance and accordingly, we classify participants in high and low performing agents. Second, participants work on the same task under either a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. This stage is used to analyze how the introduction of incentive contracts affects the productivity of high and low performing agents. In addition, we elicit individual loss aversion. Participants fill out a non-incentivized questionnaire.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer (lab experiment)
Randomization unit
Experimental session
Clusters
In total about 300 participants
Observations
About 150 participants per treatment
Arms
About 150 participants per treatment
Primary outcomes
Number of tasks solved in the real-effort task under the incentive contracts compared to baseline productivity under fixed wage contract. We will control for individual differences as given by the questionnaire.

Cited by

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Keywords